

Alastair Davidson

ANTONIO GRAMSCI: THE MAN

The concluding part of an article on the famous Italian marxist Antonio Gramsci, by a lecturer in politics at Monash University, in ALR No. 1 1968. Later articles will consider Gramsci's approach to marxism, particularly his concept of hegemony, his views on the role of a socialist party in advanced capitalist countries and on the role of intellectuals and intellectual activity.

TWO FACTS MUST BE BORNE IN MIND in understanding Gramsci's thought in the *Ordine Nuovo* period of 1919-1920. The first was the fact that he read as much Lenin as he could acquire after 1917 and disseminated it through the factories.³³ The second is that even so, very little Leninism was reaching Western Europe before late 1920 and this meant a lopsided understanding of Lenin which is clear from Gramsci's work.³⁴

In the years 1918-20 the October Revolution was often described as the revolution of the "soviets" and Lenin and Trotsky as leaders of the "soviets." The ruling idea was that the key to an understanding of the Russian revolution was an understanding of the role of the soviets. The nature of the bolshevik party was regarded as much less significant and until the second congress of the Communist International in August, 1920, which was formed to conduct the "world revolution" the nature of a communist party outside Russia was not regarded as important, even by the Russian leaders themselves. One of the earliest facts about the October revolution which Gramsci realised was the important role the soviets had played.

Almost contemporaneously with the formation of the Communist International in March, 1919, Gramsci, Togliatti, Tasca and Umberto Terracini, another Turin student, formed the paper *Ordine Nuovo* (May, 1919). This paper was to become one of the most famous papers in Italian history although in its original form it only lasted two years. At first it was intended to be only a cultural journal.³⁵ However, as Italy became more and more revolutionary and after the PSI became the first major socialist party of Western Europe to join the Comintern, socialists began

to ask themselves more and more how to conduct the revolution in Italy, where a revolutionary situation was rapidly developing.³⁶ Having decided that the soviet was a universal form and not a Russian institution Gramsci looked around for something similar in Italy and discovered the germs of the soviet system which could lead to the revolution in the commissione interna of the Turin factories.³⁷ The commissione interne were akin to the English shop stewards committees. Gramsci proposed in *Ordine Nuovo* that they be developed into factory councils, consigli di fabbrica. These consigli could ultimately cover all factories and agricultural production in Italy and provide the basis for the socialist state after the revolution. In the meantime they would be the means whereby the worker would be made conscious of himself as part of a great productive process and taught that the managing of the socialist society was not beyond his power. Through this process the worker would attain true liberty.³⁸ Gramsci felt that several problems making a revolution difficult could be solved through such a system. He felt that the nature of the Italian state had had an atomising and alienating effect on its citizens; they became the "individui-cittadini."³⁹ This meant that in moments of radicalisation and worsening of conditions, such as those which prevailed after the First World War, the Italians became anarchist or libertarian.⁴⁰ This in turn led to two developments in the leading circles of the socialist movement: either revolutionary adventurism or opposition to any attempts to take power at all.⁴¹ The development of the consigli di fabbrica would combat all these tendencies, by developing in the worker a consciousness of his social importance, preventing alienation: by combating anarchism through discipline; and by enabling the working class to take power already prepared to run the country.

In No. 7 of *Ordine Nuovo* in 1919 Gramsci launched an appeal to the very militant workers of Turin:

How can we dominate the huge social forces which the war has loosed? How can we discipline them and give them a political form which has the virtue of developing normally, of continually being integrated until it becomes the skeleton of the socialist state in which the dictatorship of the proletariat will be incarnated? How can the present be wed to the future, satisfying the urgent necessities of the present and working usefully to create and "anticipate" the future?

He suggested that the socialist state already existed potentially in the organs of the working class, the commissione interna, socialist clubs and peasant communities. They should be united and hierarchically ordered. In the first instance they should be united into regional committees. They should then demand that all state power be transferred to the consigli. He invited all "the best and most aware" workers to collaborate in this activity.

Gramsci and Togliatti and Terracini, but not Tasca, who disagreed with the primacy given by Gramsci to the consigli,⁴² had already built up personal contact with the workers in their place of work and did not rest with the appeal alone. They went into the factories, sought out the best workers and propagandised on behalf of their scheme. It took time and hard work to win support. In August 1919, only 1,100 copies of their journal were being sold in Turin and little more throughout the rest of Italy. But six months later the paper was selling over four thousand copies in all. Forty three issues came out in the first year, after which the number of copies sold seems to have settled at about 5,000 copies, though the editors hoped for ten thousand copies by the end of 1920.⁴³ This circulation was unheard of for a "piccola rassegna di cultura." The distribution was more diffused by this time, though mainly concentrated in Milan and Turin. Fascists, and Roman Catholics, as well as Socialists read *Ordine Nuovo*.

The workers responded to Gramsci's appeal, though he was no "tribune" and soon a network of consigli were established in the Turin factories. The object of the *Ordine Nuovo's* editors now became the raising of the consciousness of the workers and their cultural level. They made no concessions to working class difficulty in understanding some of their advice (unlike Stalin, who popularised marxism) "Psychologically, the period of elementary propaganda, so called "evangelism" is over."⁴⁴ The object of Gramsci's intellectuals was to develop the critical faculties of the workers. The first task of the workers was to discipline themselves and organise themselves. "The Communist revolution is essentially a problem of organisation and discipline," he wrote. The organisation would have to start in the factories and then be diffused into the country.

All these policies seem very similar to the Leninist principles in *What is to be Done?*, but they were completely independent in inspiration. Before the Second Congress of the Comintern in August, 1920, Gramsci knew little about democratic centralism. Only Gramsci's directions that the present task of the communists was to encourage the creation and development of consigli of workers and peasants and their eventual unification in a national organisation and to capture a majority in such a congress, were, perhaps, inspired by Lenin's policies vis-a-vis the soviets. However, his assertion that the communist party could have no competitors was independent.

The directions he was making to the workers seem fairly obvious ones, but the backwardness of the Italian working class movement at this time must be remembered. Such elementary directions were

needed. His real originality (if we do not admit that arriving at Leninism without having read Lenin is original in itself) lay in his obiter dicta and use of a wide knowledge of up-to-date Western European work in political science and sociology.

In *Ordine Nuovo*, Gramsci argued that the main advantage of placing the consigli in prime position in the creation of a dictatorship of the proletariat, and maintaining that the unions and then the socialist party were passe forms, lay in the fact that only in such a hierarchy could the workers reach an awareness of their ability to administer the state without the bourgeoisie. They would learn on the job their own all-important role in the capitalist state. They would also, because they were close to their social roles, more quickly discard their mythical, utopian, religious and petty bourgeois beliefs in favour of one based on their role in production.⁴⁵ This mental readjustment was a sine qua non for revolution. It is important to note that emphasis on the importance of ideas precluded the theories developed later by Gramsci.

Gramsci argued determinedly in 1919-20 that the existing institutions of capitalism could not be used to conduct the revolution, nor, indeed, could those which had arisen in response to the capitalist system, that is the trade unions and the Socialist Party. He used the Michels thesis to indicate the manner in which such supposed proletarian institutions became estranged from the mass. Their leaders, he asserted, were too far from the mass to appreciate what the mass was feeling.

Nor did he admit that the state ushered in by the revolution would be a parliamentary democratic state. It too would be something completely new in which the communist party would at first be dominant.

Gramsci's thought on the role of the party went through several stages. The changes in his attitudes were determined both by the developments in Italy in 1919-20 and the influence of the Comintern on his ideas. They cannot be understood separate from these two factors. In 1919 the situation in Italy grew more and more unstable. It "felt" revolutionary. The Socialist Party proved unable to lead the proletariat to a revolution. It lacked both a programme of action and the will. Then, in October it affiliated to the Communist International and announced its commitment to the methods used in Russia. Shortly after Gramsci wrote an article called "The Party and the Revolution." This said that the PSI was the agent of a revolution being made by the complex of socio-economic conditions in which the masses were living. It was not the controller of the masses. Its job was to subtract from

bourgeois democracy the "consensus" of the governed in the system. This was the negative function for the party. Its positive function consisted of diffusing in the masses via the new institutions its Idea (Weltanschauung) which would provoke a consciousness in the workers of the manner in which they would run the new society. The task of the Socialist Party consisted of convincing the masses that Italy under the current system of production was producing only half her needs. The only way out of the dilemma was to introduce a new social system.⁴⁶ Four months later he wrote another article: revolution still hung "like a spectre" over Europe. In this article he drew a distinction between the Socialist party and the Communist Party. The first had a multiclass base, the second a proletarian. The various classes supporting the first could have divergent interests. The second's followers saw their only salvation in revolution. The job of the PSI, while not neglecting the other classes, was to build a ruling class psychology in the proletariat proper.

How to carry out the revolution was the all important question. He called on the PSI to proceed with its task of educating the working class through the consigli and to call a national congress of consigli. Perhaps his more critical attitude towards the PSI was due to the admonition of the Comintern to the PSI to beware of the "reformists" in its midst.⁴⁷ In the same number he loosed a determined attack on the "reformists." In mid-1920 the revolutionary wave was ebbing and already the Comintern was seeking to explain why the world revolution it had foretold for 1920 had not occurred. One of the reasons it advanced was that there was an absence of real revolutionary parties throughout the workers' movement. Before it announced its intention to have all Communist Parties conform to the bolshevik model, Gramsci wrote a further article calling for a renewal of the Socialist Party. This was delivered to the Milan congress held in April, 1920 just after a general strike had broken out in Turin. The PSI leaders and the congress did not support the strikers. This made the Ordinovisti and the Turin workers very bitter. Gramsci wrote (Togliatti delivered the report, which was ignored by the leadership led by G. M. Serrati): "The present phase of the class struggle in Italy is the phase which precedes: either the conquest of political power by the proletariat in order to pass on to new modes of production and distribution which allow a renewal of productivity; or a tremendous reactionary triumph by the propertied class and the governing caste."⁴⁸ In this situation, because the socialist party was doing nothing to organise the masses, they were incapable of taking power. The PSI, despite its affirmations at the Bologna congress had remained a parliamentary party and done nothing about the

"reformists" in its midst. He warned that the working class would form a new party, which was cohesive and strongly disciplined. He gave warning that a faction would be created to convert the PSI.

After this date, his attacks in the PSI, a traditional socialist party came thick and fast. He accused the PSI of being primarily governed by the values of the bourgeoisie. In August, the Second Comintern congress occurred. This instructed the PSI to adopt democratic centralism and to expel the reformists led by Turati. The Italian delegation resisted these directions, and Lenin announced that he thought that the line of the Ordinovisti was correct. Soon after the Turin workers occupied the factories of Turin. The PSI refused to extend the movement and the "reformists" attacked the protagonists of the occupation. Gramsci now turned on the PSI. It was no longer revolutionary he said; it was like the British Labour Party, a conglomerate of parties. He announced that at the next congress the communists would turn it into a communist party.⁴⁹ At Leghorn in January, 1921 the communists seceded to form the PCI. By that time the occupation of the factories had collapsed and the revolutionary wave was over in Italy.⁵⁰

One of the main reasons for the impotence of Gramsci's group was its refusal to conduct factional activity in the PSI or to build an opposition until it was too late. He himself admitted this later.⁵¹ Whether there could have been a revolution in Italy had his schemes been developed by the party will never be known. He felt so, and I am inclined to agree.

Anticipating the content of later articles on his theory, I will point out here that the policies advised for socialists in Gramsci's *Ordine Nuovo* period nearly all contradict his later theories. The charge of inconsistency can be avoided if we recognise that conditions changed—the theories he was to evolve later were for advanced industrial or capitalist societies in a state of comparative social stability. In 1919-20 he was advancing theories to cope with a revolutionary situation. He himself recognised that they were methods for peculiar or particular circumstances.⁵² On the other hand it should also be remembered that he was still groping towards a clarification of his ideas at this time and greatly influenced by the Leninism he read. Even so, at this time there were already in embryo some of his future thoughts, and I shall refer back to these in other articles.

The next phase of Gramsci's life lasted from early 1921 until 1926 when he was arrested by the Fascist regime and jailed. He remained in jail until a short time before his death in 1937. This

phase, too was characterised by "leftism," although there can also be discerned a retreat from the values of Leninism as imposed by the Comintern.

In January, 1921 the Communist Party was formed at Leghorn after the maximalist majority, led by G. Serrati, had refused to implement the Twenty One conditions of membership in the PSI. The communist party was rather heterogeneously composed at first. Apart from Gramsci's group there was the "abstentionist" group led by Amadeo Bordiga and an extreme-left socialist group. Gramsci's Ordinovisti group was recognised by all as the leading intellectual group but Gramsci allowed the leading positions in the party to fall into the hands of Bordiga and his followers. Only Terracini was on the first executive committee of the PCI and he had been the least "Gramscian" of Gramsci's followers in 1919-20.⁵³ Gramsci thus allowed control of the party to slip into the hands of a group with which he had never really seen eye to eye and which had opposed him on various occasions.⁵⁴

Though the first communist leadership did not realise it, there were two main problems to be faced in 1921-22; the menace of fascism and reconciliation with the socialists. The leadership was strongly "leftist" kept hoping for a revolution and regarded the "maximalists" as worse than the "reformists."⁵⁵ Their attitude thus preluded the disastrous policies of the German Communist Party in 1928-33.

This leadership, perhaps drunk with the revolutionary fervour of the past, continued to call for revolution, and presented it as just around the corner. It neglected to unite to fight against fascism. Squadristo was growing worse throughout the year 1921, however, and the Socialist Party entered what Nenni calls its period of defeat. They concluded a Pact of Pacification with the fascists, which while it temporarily resulted in a discontinuation of the brawling, looked like a capitulation to the class enemy. The Communists immediately dissociated themselves from this Pact and Gramsci pointed out its shortsightedness.⁵⁶ Both the PCI and the PSI lost members.⁵⁷

Late in 1921 the Comintern, recognising that the communist movement was on the defensive and that the revolutionary wave had subsided, announced the introduction of the united front. This instructed the communists to reunite with the socialists to fight reaction and to play down revolution until the time was more appropriate. Coming so soon after the split, these directions seemed the rankest of opportunism to the Bordiga leadership. At the Rome congress of March 1922 they drew up theses which were primarily an attack on the united front. These denied the

possibility of winning the masses by toning down the theory. They argued that only "objective conditions" would allow this mass support to be won. What the party said or did would make no difference and it should stick to its guns.

Gramsci's attitude at this time is obscure. According to Bordiga he supported the Rome theses. According to himself he opposed them. According to Tasca he supported them for tactical reasons.⁵⁸ It seems probable, given his past, that he supported the theses in principle but was troubled by the party's indiscipline vis-a-vis the Comintern.

In 1922, and much of 1923, he was in the Soviet Union, working in the Comintern and recovering from illness in various Soviet hospitals. He married Giulia Schucht after meeting her while in the hospital. They had two children (b 1924 and 1926). It was during this period that Gramsci was able to see the way the Soviet Union and the Communist International functioned. He was also far removed from the Italy where the fascists came to power in October 1922.

In the struggle against fascism the Communist Party had been "absent", because of its refusal to unite with the PSI. Consequently throughout the year 1922, while he was in Moscow, the Comintern and the PCI had been more and more at loggerheads. In July 1922, despite the communist opposition to the united front, the Comintern invited the PSI to rejoin it:

... if Serrati has really recognised his mistakes he will have no choice but to reconsider everything he has said and written against the Communist International. ... He feared to prepare for the revolutionary struggle and now he can see that to renounce it was a preparation for the victory of the fascists. If it were merely a question of Serrati we might mock him tu l'as voulu Georges Dandin. But behind Serrati there are still tens of thousands of workers and so we say every Party can make mistakes, honest workers' leaders can also make mistakes but they must prove their honesty by recognising their mistakes, learning from them and finding the way back to the correct road of struggle marked out for proletarians of the entire world by the Communist International.⁵⁹

The leadership opposed this readmission of the prodigal son. However, since the PCI had first been formed because the PSI had refused to expel the "reformists", the leadership found itself on shaky ground after the PSI did finally expel the "reformists" at its Milan congress. The much weakened revolutionary socialists were ready to reconsider fusion with the PCI, which the Comintern now advised too. Gramsci vacillated at first between support for the Comintern and support for Bordiga but slowly moved over to the Comintern position. Given his constant insistence on the need for discipline in 1919-1920, his attitudes towards Bordiga are understandable. However, his support of the Comintern was contingent on its not misusing the other communist parties in

Soviet interests. He was present at the Fourth Comintern Congress at which Bordiga was also present. There he supported the fusion while Bordiga opposed it, accepting the decisions of the congress only for disciplinary reasons.⁶⁰

On his return to Italy, Bordiga showed that he was not prepared to carry out the directions of the Comintern to unite with the Socialists. Besides the rump of the socialists raised technical problems to unifications. Quite clearly, at this stage and throughout 1923, the former Ordinovisti group, with the exception of Gramsci, supported Bordiga's position. Togliatti, Terracini and others spoke out against the mode of fusion.⁶¹ Only the rightwing of the party, led by Tasca, was firmly in favour of the united front. Gramsci's position can be gauged from his fear of the Right. He was still erring to the left emotionally but he attempted to reform the Ordinovisti group to pressure Bordiga into carrying out the Comintern line and failed. The hostility of communists towards the socialists was too great.⁶²

In November 1923 Gramsci moved to Vienna, perhaps in order to be closer to the party, which since the fascists had come to power the previous year had been operating in conditions of de facto illegality. He had now given up hope of recreating the *Ordine Nuovo* group but he continued his activity of organising a new leadership for the PCI, which, now that Bordiga was in jail, was shared by the rightwing and the followers of Bordiga in the party. Gramsci's former colleagues were still supporting Bordiga, who from prison was circulating material opposing the united front. The near collapse of the socialist movement, including the communists, in early 1924, may have been one reason why Gramsci managed to create an opposition in the party in that year. First one, and then the other, of the leading men of the party: Togliatti, Terracini and Scoccamarro, came over to his position in favour of working with the rump of the Socialist Party. Gramsci tolerated no compromise with Bordiga. The triumph of his line in the party leadership came at a meeting of the Central Committee held on 18th April 1924. The Comintern announced that it had no further complaint about the activities of the PCI. A month later the communists and the rump of the socialists ran on a joint list in the elections, winning fifteen seats. Gramsci was elected for the Veneto electorate and returned to Italy after an absence of two years. He now had parliamentary immunity from fascist persecution.

On his return he immediately set about preparing the PCI for clandestine activity. He found that many of the PCI members still supported Bordiga. This made his task more difficult. Meanwhile fascist repression grew worse and worse. Within the PCI,

opposition to the Fifth Comintern Congress demand that it "bolshevise" itself grew more acute.

Up to 1925 Gramsci had proved a loyal follower of the Comintern, leading the opposition to Bordiga in support of the Comintern policy and supporting the bolshevisation of the PCI. In 1925 and 1926 his attitudes began to undergo a change. Had he remained free he might well have joined Bordiga, who was expelled as a Trotskyite in 1927, in the limbo of communist non-persons. The change in attitude was the result of a number of developments. First, Gramsci had had time to meditate on the nature of the Comintern and began to have second thoughts about its usefulness and its function. For it was now in 1924 that the Comintern started to come under the aegis of Stalin and the transfer of faction fights from the CPSU (B) to the Comintern began. Gramsci was not averse to the introduction of bolshevik discipline to the PCI provided this did not mean that the PCI would be misused through Russian carelessness or in Russian interests. The Comintern had the moral obligation of duty towards its sections. However, the process of bolshevisation coincided with directions for more aggressive activity by the PCI. While in 1922-4 discipline had coincided with the imposition of what Gramsci regarded as a correct line of working with socialists this new line did not. He himself accused the Comintern of applying irrelevant Russian methods to Italy. Interestingly, this had been the position of the PSI before Livorno and Bordiga after 1921. Gramsci wrote in 1926 a letter cleared by the PCI and addressed to the Russian leaders:

Comrades, in these nine years . . . you have been the organising and motivating element for the revolutionary forces of all countries. . . But today you are destroying your work. You are degrading, and running the risk of nullifying, the ruling function that the Communist Party of the USSR conquered through Lenin's efforts; to us, it seems that the violent passion of Russian questions is making you lose sight of the international aspects of the Russian question itself, makes you forget that your duty as Russian militants can and must be fulfilled only within the framework of the interests of the proletarian International.

He added with reference to bolshevisation

unity and discipline in this case cannot be mechanical and compulsory; they must stem from loyalty and conviction and not like those of an imprisoned or besieged enemy division from thoughts of escape or surprise sorties.⁶³

This letter reputedly never reached the leaders of the CPSU being "put in the wastepaper basket" by Togliatti.

However, although Gramsci was already showing doubts about Russian developments and certainly did not agree with the communist premise which ruled thereafter that the first duty of the communist was to secure the Soviet Union, I do not feel that we can distinguish the lines of his future thought in the 1926 Lyons

theses of the PCI, which were the last official documents he drew up.⁶⁴ On the whole these documents were "leftist" in tenor and have been admitted by Togliatti to be partly "leftist" in tenor.⁶⁵ Most of them were concerned with the bolshevisation of the PCI which was secured to some extent at this congress. It is true that there was considerable attention paid in Gramsci's speech to the tactics called for by the conditions of Italy, which he classified as semi-industrialised. However, at this time it was Comintern policy for parties to take into account the national conditions of the country. Furthermore, Gramsci's analysis of Italy was fairly similar to that given by the Comintern. It is too easy now to read into early communist documents traces of national communism. A case can only be made out if they are in conflict with the ruling Comintern directions. In this case they were not. So with Gramsci, we can only say that he was reformulating his thought and his attitudes at this time.

It was after he was sent to prison under the Exceptional Laws which were passed by Mussolini in late 1926 that his thought really started to develop in new directions. Had he been outside the prison where what he was doing could have been observed he would almost certainly have been expelled from the PCI. So, another factor in the understanding of Gramsci's thought is the fact that he was able to write as a communist without being subjected to the moral and political pressures placed on communists by their own leaders in the years which followed 1926. Of course, he was subjected to other pressures. The object of the court in sending him to jail for more than twenty years was to "prevent this brain from working for twenty years." The fascist regime did its best to make things difficult for him. Only his perseverance enabled him to receive the enormous amount of reading material which provided the source of his Prison Notebooks. At first he was imprisoned on the island of Ustica off the South of Italy, but he spent most of his term in Turi di Bari in miserable conditions, designed to kill him. Eventually the regime succeeded, releasing him just before his death. Always in poor health, he suffered agonies from various ailments, including tuberculosis. He complained very little, and to the last maintained a clear mind of great brilliance.

Unlike his earlier work which was written on the spur of the moment for political purposes, his work in prison was "fur ewig", for history,⁶⁶ and indeed it seems to be of lasting value.

In it there came to fruition his knowledge of Italian conditions, of Marxism and of Croceian idealism, synthesised into a marxist theory for advanced industrial countries. This is the theory I will discuss in future articles.

33 "Trent'anni di Vita e Lotte del P.C.I." *Quaderni di Rinascita*, II, p.37.

34 See J. Hulse, *The Forming of the Communist International*, (Stanford, 1964). Australian readers must not assume that it took as long for Leninism to reach Italy as it did to reach Australia where *What is to be Done?* was only read in 1925. Togliatti has indicated that Italian translations of the contemporary works, i.e. non theoretical works of Lenin were reaching Italy in late 1918.

35 *Ordine Nuovo*, p.146: A. Tasca, op.cit., *Il Mondo*, 25 August 1953.

36 A. B. Davidson, op.cit.

37 M. Guarnieri, *I consigli di Fabbrica*, (Il Solco, n.d.)

38 *Ordine Nuovo*, pp.146-154.

39 Ibid., pp., 4, 14 and passim.

40 Ibid., pp.23, 72, 311, 379.

41 Ibid., pp.403.

42 A. Tasca, *Il Mondo*, 25 August 1953.

43 *Ordine Nuovo*, pp. 448, 463, 472-3.

44 Ibid., p.446.

45 Ibid., pp.29-30.

46 Ibid., p.67.

47 Ibid., pp.91ff.

48 *Ordine Nuovo*, p.117.

49 Ibid., p.161.

50 Some writers maintain that the peak was reached in April 1920, Cammett, op.cit., p.101.

51 P. Togliatti, *Antonio Gramsci etc*, pp.43ff.

52 *Ordine Nuovo*, p.98.

53 For an assessment of Terracini see P. Gobetti in *Rivoluzione Liberale*, 2. IV, 1922 in Valeri, op.cit., pp.595-6.

54 E.g. Bordiga had opposed Gramsci at the Second Comintern Congress.

55 *Livorno*, 1921 (resoconto stenografico) (Milan, 1962) pp.470-4.

56 Original letter of Ex-Comm. PCI dated 6 July 1921.

57 About 100,000 socialists did not renew membership in either party.

58 P. Togliatti, *La Formazione del Gruppo dirigente del Partito Comunista*, (Rome, 1962), pp.192-3; Tasca, op.cit. *Il Mondo*, 1 September 1953.

59 J. Degras, *The Communist International, Documents, I* (London, 1960) p.364.

60 *Fourth Congress of the Communist International, Abridged Report*, (London, pp.276-279).

61 P. Togliatti, *Formazione etc*, pp.55, 142, passim.

62 Ibid., pp.66-7.

63 Tasca, op.cit., *Il Mondo*, 15 September 1953.

64 See J. Cammett, op.cit., p.170ff.

65 Togliatti, *Il Partito Comunista Italiano*, (Milan), p.61.

66 *Lettere dal Carcere*, p.58.