The pattern of welfare capitalism, though reached by a peculiar local route, was reasonably similar to what developed in other parts of the capitalist world after the period of revolutionary upheaval in the 1940s. In the re-establishment of world capitalism, American military and financial power were crucial; the financial pre-eminence of the British had been destroyed in the war and the United States emerged as the main source of international investment, as well as the defender of the boundaries. It remained the base of most of the growing multinational companies that controlled the capital flow, and that rapidly increased their stake in Australia. There was thus a hard material basis, as well as the military motives provided by the Japanese assault in 1942 and the fantastic Communist attacks of the 1950s and 1960s, for a shift by Australian governments into the American orbit. Curtin and Evatt began it, albeit under pressure; Menzies swallowed his Britishity and followed suit. This was not the only way that Australia became integrated into the new world order. The reconstruction of capitalist economies in Europe and North America on a high-technology basis absorbing most of the local workforce created new demands for pools of unskilled labour which should be highly mobile and subject to political control. In these regions, and in Australia, the need was increasingly met by immigration—a form of development and, as it has been remarked, from the poor countries to the rich. Women, who had provided a large part of the labour force for wartime production, being pushed back into the home and child-rearing, and with Aborigines disengaged in the outback, the labour had to come from overseas. The federal Labor government, spurred on by racist fears reawakened by the Pacific war, launched a European immigration programme, which was taken over by the Liberals. A steady, heavy inflow totalled nearly two million in two decades. The migrants fed the industrial workforce, providing, for instance, three-quarters of the 1965–55 increase at B.H.P.'s Newcastle and Port Kembla steelworks, and much of the labour with which the government’s welfare system supplied from the remote Leigh Creek coalfield and the eastern states got hooked up to the Snowy Mountains. They also supplied an increasing proportion of labour for unskilled jobs in the major cities; with migrant women, drawn into jobs in much higher proportion than Australian-born women, the most heavily exploited of all.

Sponsored immigration had been a traditional resort of capitalists wishing to drive wages and conditions down. Though the new workers were vulnerable, as migrants always are, and some more so because of language barriers and social isolation, they did not generally (at least in the short run) depress standards. Money wages rose and continued to rise in the 1950s and 1960s, real income following more slowly because of inflation. With increasing inequality in wage rates after about 1950, native-born workers did better out of the boom than the migrants, since the latter were more concentrated in unskilled jobs. What happened, rather, was an increased segmentation of the working class. As in other capitalist powers—though less markedly than in Germany or the United States—the migrants formed a relatively exploited and isolated lower stratum of the working class, with little representation in unions or political organisations, lower than average wages, and often the worst housing and provision for education. Concentrations of migrant workers and their families began to form in the old inner-city working-class suburbs such as Redfern, Leichhardt, and Carlton. In some ways, this reproduced in an ethnic framework the dense social networks of the generations before the boom, but for the most part they lacked the old connection with labour politics and working-class consciousness.

The capital for expansion came from both internal and external sources. Some companies were able to finance the growth of their plants out of their own profits; B.H.P., for instance, was notorious among capitalists for paying only a modest dividend to shareholders and financing expansion from the retained earnings. Others raised new capital on the Australian share market, or by loans. Some important new sources were becoming available. Insurance companies changed their rules and began investing in shares and supplying inter-company loans. By the late 1950s it was reckoned that they were supplying about one-fifth of all new money in the share market, and they rapidly became the biggest shareholders in the major public companies. The banks also shifted from their previous heavy concentration on the pastoral industry, becoming more closely interlocked with manufacturing.

It appears, further, that direct share ownership became more widespread; certainly the numbers of shareholders in individual companies rose markedly. Olympic rose from 50 in 1953 to about 13,000 at its founder’s death in 1959. C.S.R., a big company with nearly 5000 shareholders in 1934, rose to over 32,000 in 1954. Though the 1960s, the numbers rose again, and a dozen or more companies had more than 30,000 shareholders in the early 1970s, with B.H.P. reaching 180,000. Such figures were acclaimed by business theorists as evidence of ‘people’s capitalism’, the interpretation is a little stretched by the fact that the biggest 5 per cent of shareholders controlled more than 50 per cent of the shares, and the sketchy evidence available about the actual social composition of shareholders shows most of the men to
come from the upper levels of the occupational structure. Effective power in companies was not diffused. But in these ways the fund-raising network of corporate capitalism was spread more widely. As with savings, employment was increasingly absorbed into the corporate structure and the state. The proportion of the workforce who were "self-employed" had been gradually declining from the 1920s—from 16 per cent in 1921 to 8 per cent in 1966.49

The growth in the scale of companies that these figures suggest was related to changes in the process of production, the beginnings of which have already been sketched: an advance of mechanisation; the routinisation of many labour processes, both manual and clerical; and changes in the demand for different categories of workers. By the 1960s, conferences were being held and learned opinions given on the impact of "automation", and a small computing industry began to develop (though the computers themselves were always imported). Ideas of a technological revolution were exaggerated, but there certainly was a general mechanisation of farming, earth-moving and materials handling, which reduced the demand for old-fashioned brawn—most spectacularly with containerisation on the wharves in the 1960s and 1970s. At the same time, clerical and administrative work was reorganised along factory lines, with large offices in the city centres organised for the mass processing of people and information by a division of labour among relatively unskilled workers. Seeking the cheapest labour, the managers of these offices created a segregated labour market for women; especially young women, for whom routine clerical work became the standard occupation in the way domestic service had been two generations before. These processes were of course going on in other industrial countries at the same time. The shifts in the structure of labour were masked in Australia by the fact that the move to secondary industry was occurring simultaneously with the growth in tertiary industry (administration, services); but even so, the relative numbers of "white-collar" workers grew from about 30 per cent of the workforce in the decades before the Second World War to about 40 per cent in the decades after. The percentage rose more steeply among women than among men.49

These changes were spurred by the import of capital, in increasing volume, from overseas, often bringing new technology with it. The arrival of foreign-based manufacturing companies behind the import control and tariff barriers has already been noted—a process vigorously encouraged by federal and state governments in pursuit of development. American firms in particular made very high profits in the 1950s, but even when the rate fell in the early 1960s, their profits remained higher than those of Australian firms. The total of foreign capitalisation's investment in Australia rose from about £300 million in the late 1940s to about $10,000 million in the early 1970s, the American share having risen to near par with the British. By 1974, a quarter of the fifty largest companies in the country were subsidiaries of multinational corporations; official inquiries, when finally made, reckoned that foreign capital held between a quarter and a third of the entire corporate capital of the country. Japanese investment followed American in the 1960s. From being an appendage of one of the most vigorous entrepreners in post-war history, this firm moved into mining operations in Australia as part of a world-wide programme. It set up huge projects in aluminium in Queensland, iron in Western Australia and copper in New Guinea; took over uranium and zinc interests and aluminium refining facilities. Its operations were financed by international long-term loan finance, long-term international sales contracts, and mass production techniques at the site on a scale far beyond that of the tentative beginnings of mechanised mining in Australia between the wars. By the 1970s its local holding company, Cominco Rio Tinto of Australia, formed in 1962, was the second largest concentration of capital in Australia; and the copper-mining operation alone was so profitable that it became politically embarrassing.

G.M.A. was only the most conspicuous example of a large-scale move into mining by foreign-owned and local companies. Stimulated by an upsurge in world base-metal demand, mining became in the 1960s the major growth point of the economy, considerably outstripping the rate of investment in manufacturing, and a series of new mining towns grew in the outback, most notably in the Pilbara iron ore region of Western Australia. With high-technology, mass-production methods, these were in many ways closer to manufacturing industries than to traditional underground mining; and the companies paid very high rates to attract skilled workers. But it remained an enclave industrialisation—"decentralisation and development", as the companies preferred to call it—with plants widely separated, and much of the produce shipped off in raw or semi-processed state overseas.51

The industry that made the deepest impact after steelmaking was the motor trade. We have sketched the origins of this as an industrial complex between the wars. Its significance changed qualitatively in the late 1940s: in twenty more years, it had become the biggest in the country, with ten of the top fifty companies, car and truck manufacturers (Chrysler, Ford, G.M.H.), part and pty manufacturers (Repsco, Dunlop, Olympic), and petrol refiners and distributors (Ampol, B.P., Mobil, Shell). The car became a central feature of working-class life and culture, a basis of the economies of everyday life.

The growth of this complex represented a massive change in the way a basic social service, transport, was provided. The change was not expected or planned; in the 1920s for instance N.S.W. authorities were planning the expansion of the city of Sydney on the assumption that the mass transport of the future would be trains, and build its Bridge and Underground on that assumption. The motor car was first a toy of the ruling class (there is a fine photograph of S. M. Bruce standing proudly beside his Rolls-Royce) or of technical enthusiasts. Manufacturers began building them as a modest market opened up among the affluent. Federal governments gave the manufacturers protectionist tariff policies in line with the general policy of protection, and encouraged them to build locally because of the military advantages of a motor industry. Demand surged post-war because of the suburban expansion, already discussed, into areas where there were no good alternative means of transport, and the spread of suburbs farther from railways, so the two spiralled together. Mass production cheapened the relative price of cars and brought them in range of rising working class incomes; the growth of hire-purchase sublimated the marriage, while blending workers in new forms of economic dependence. The phenomenal growth of car, home and appliance ownership in turn boosted the business of the finance companies, formerly poor relations of banking, to the
largely financed by the insurance companies, notably the A.M.P. in Sydney, which had heavy surpluses of funds to invest; and by the big mining and industrial companies which wanted new head offices. Sydney, now coming to rival Melbourne as the centre of Australian capitalism and point of entry for international capital, set the pace with the M.L.C. building and then a forest of office blocks near the harbour. The big Melbourne companies soon followed: B.H.P., whose headquarters had lived in dingy rented offices throughout its rise, built itself an Essington Lewis House; the pace of growth soon outstripped it and in 1932 it moved into B.H.P. House, a dark tower dominating the city skyline. Simultaneously, attempts were made to introduce freeway systems to service this expanded commuter centre and build outer-suburban nodes for corporate retailing (Roadlands, Gladstone). To prevent insolvency with this from over-zealous planners and Labor organisations, the corporate leadership mobilised its political resources in the very complex system of councils and state authorities that governed the cities; but it must be admitted that until the end of the 1940s there was little articulate resistance of any kind, the whole thing being justified by the ideology of development and governments pactified by the prospect of increased rates and taxes.

The office blocks of the central cities are more than the functional centres of companies. Like the classical temples of the nineteenth-century bankers, and indeed the Georgian mansions of the pastoralists, these buildings are the visible expression of class power, the symbols of a new ascendency. Each one built because companies wanted prestigious and modern (terms that were practically equated) head offices, they are collectively the statement of an industrial ruling class. The functional, abstract, metallic style is of course the classical one of the industrial age. B.H.P. House was largely designed in Chicago—but perhaps that makes it even more appropriate to the contemporary Australian ruling class.84

Hegemony and the Working Class

The changes in business ideology catalysed by the I.P.A., and the changes in architecture just noted, were not isolated. Both shared the theme of modernisation, which can be understood as the cultural form taken by traditional developmentalist in the period of industrial capitalism. Parallel developments can be found in many art forms, such as the marked growth of abstract painting and sculpture. The economic links here are obvious: businesses bought paintings and art objects to decorate the new office blocks, architects professionals bought them for their homes and waiting-rooms. They wanted prestige, modernism, and no awkward social content; abstract art, or art that mythologised the Australian past, supplied them. In literature, less marketable, the links were less direct; but here too a change occurred towards subjectivity and elitism in a revulsion from the radical enthusiasms of the 1930s and 1940s. At the simplest level, poetry became more unintelligible (except to literate) as its practitioners pursued technique and subtleties of consciousness. At a rather more complex level, the preoccupations of novelists shifted from social critique, of which the last landmark was Frank Hardy’s Power Without Glory, a massive indictment of Wren and the
corruption of labour politics, to the exploration of psychological and ontological issues epitomised by Patrick White. Commenting on some related changes in academic writing, one conservative journalist wrote in 1962 of 'the counter-revolution in Australian biography'. This was exaggerated, but it is undoubtedly true that there was a broad shift towards conservatism among Australian intellectuals, or where not explicitly conservative, at least towards concerns and techniques that were cut off from the politics and everyday life of the working class.

The high culture of the period, for all the occasional disinterest of particular artists, was essentially affirmative; it crowned the world of industrial capitalism with prestige and unapologetic elegance. The Opera House, Cultural Centre and Festival Theatre of Sydney, Melbourne and Adelaide were perfect epitomes. In the much broader sphere of popular arts, industrial design, home decoration, and so on, the same style spread. Home ownership in the suburbs as a desirable form of life, as well as the equipment necessary for it, was actively sold to the working class and provided a context for this. Popular magazines after the war spread the gospel of 'modern' styling, along with the message of high consumption; the electrical equipment increasingly invading the household spread the same tastes. The rising popularity of motor sport, massively publicised by the motor and oil industry from the Redex reliability trials of the early 1950s to Jack Brabham's international racing triumphs of the 1960s, spread the gospel of technicole among working-class youth.34

From the point of view of the working class, re-establishment of bourgeois hegemony is a process of demobilisation, of some withdrawal from a state of class distinctiveness, class consciousness, and organisation for struggle. A defeat is not necessarily equivalent to a demobilisation, as is shown by many industrial and electoral losses after which the labour movement has sprung back. But the political defeats around 1930 were followed by a demobilisation, and the reasons plainly extend far beyond politics into changes in domestic life, new patterns of division in the working class, and changes in the roles of the state as well as the cultural ascendency of the industrial bourgeoisie.

In the new outer suburbs, working-class families found more physical freedom, but a new economic dependence. Most of the housing had been built for sale, not for rent, and finance companies supplied a large volume of credit to allow home-buying on terms. The loans were long-term, usually twenty or twenty-five years, and represented a big commitment to stability and continuity of work, quite apart from the upkeep of what were commonly ill-designed and indifferently-built houses. As the suburbs developed at minimal cost by private builders or housing commissions, lacked collective services and equipment, the cost of cars, washing-machines and vacuum cleaners, television sets and refrigerators went into household budgets and on to hire-purchase bills. Unions found their members increasingly reluctant to enter long disputes, and many shifted tactics towards short demonstration strikes.35

The social life of these suburbs was very much home-centred. Most leisure time was spent working around the home, in the garden, on the car; and if survey evidence is to be believed, any extra leisure on the part of housewives would have been spent on more housework. With the spread of television, in
half the houses in the late 1950s and in practically all by the late 1960s, entertainment became mainly home-centred as well. Kinship networks were kept up, by telephone, visiting, and mutual help in family crises. But the small networks of older working-class suburbs were mostly lost, and with it much of the municipal strength of labour politics. In the new suburbs, it was typically professionals and local businessmen who provided the 'Grecian leaders' and tried to whip the inhabitants into participation in 'community affairs', as they defined them. Periodically working-class neighbour- hoods might mobilise around a class issue, such as rent or repayments; but even this was very difficult to organise, except in housing-commission areas, or the rich for neighbours to share the same landlord or financier and hence be able to act jointly. Such forms of collective action as union women's auxiliaries died away, even in the old mining towns; in the new mining towns of the far north, domestic life was markedly privatized and kept at arms' length by the unions.

'Suburba' and 'affluence' (the two hardly distinguished) were often regarded by intellectuals at the time as direct reasons for the decline of political labour. This is too simple: as a new generation of Labour leaders (notably Whitlam, Dunstan and Wran) showed, the electoral decline of Labor could be reversed, and that partly by campaigns on suburban issues. But it is undoubtedly true that the sense of class distinctiveness was eroded in the new environment, along with the municipal base of traditional Labour politics. The low-density suburb was a living environment created by business, initially unplanned, full of problems for its inhabitants, lacking public land, buildings, and services. It had to be made to work, and a great deal of effort went into making it habitable; but it was so structured that most of this effort had to be organised on a household-by-household basis. It was very difficult to make or sustain a collective response to diffuse pressures and isolating geography; and that was compounded by the fact that the adults who spent most time in this setting, the married women, had the bulk of their energy absorbed by child-rearing and solitary domestic labour. The post-war suburbs did not abolish the working-class, or class consciousness, but they certainly helped fragment it.

Other events tending to divide the working class have been mentioned. One is the inflow of migrants and their concentration, initially at least, in the worst-paid jobs. It is difficult to estimate the cultural and political effects of this. There was certainly widespread prejudice, against Southern European migrants especially, on the part of Australian-born workers, though direct economic competition was slight; and this is one reason for their slow entry into union posts, party politics, and so on. But the encounter of a pre-industrial population with industrial capitalism is notoriously turbulent, and the migrant workers were not entirely passive. At the Mount Isa lead-zinc and copper mine in Queensland, a fierce struggle with the American owners and the Queensland government broke out in 1964; migrants were among the most militant. A big strike against General Motors in Victoria in the same year began in a workshop almost entirely composed of Greeks. In the nine-week strike against Ford in 1973 at Broadmeadows, one of the most bitter confrontations since the 1940s, it was largely migrant workers who insisted on holding out when even Communist union officials were willing to compromise.

Similarly, the expansion of 'white-collar' occupations — clerical, adminis-

trative and technical workers — increased the stratification of the working class; but as these became mass occupations and their work routinised, they organised. White-collar unions expanded — against some resistance by employers, but nothing as fierce as the opposition encountered by the clerical and bank officers around the time of the First World War — and became industrially more active. Starled by the employers' application in the federal wage case in 1952 to reduce the basic wage and increase standard hours of work, and a 1954 declaration by the court that margin increases would not be automatic but would have to be fought for, the white-collar union decided on central organisation. The New South Wales and Victorian peak organisations federated to form the Australian Council of Salaried and Professional Associations (A.C.S.P.A.) in 1956. Notably, they did not join the A.C.T.U.: and a fair number of white-collar unions, especially public service unions which had their own federal organisations, stayed out. The event was hardly a triumph of working-class solidarity. But even semi-professional groups began entering the industrial arena: in 1961—62 the engineers used the arbitration system very effectively to establish their claims for professional pay and conditions, and during the 1960s, air pilots' and teachers' strikes scandalised the orthodox.

In some ways, what was happening here was a reversion to a very old pattern — the use of techniques of industrial action by privileged groups in the workforce to maintain their distance and extend their privileges over other employees. The 'labour aristocracy' of the nineteenth century was re-in-

carnated, on a basis not of traditional manual skill, but of professional knowledge. A Colombian and technical education, which the labour movement in a vague way supposed, developed in a socially divisive way. To the extent that working-class youth entered the new mass universities and colleges (which remained, nevertheless, mainly the preserve of the affluent), they were cut off from their age mates and thrust into a new form of hegemonised class consciousness, the ideology of professionalism, which was absurdly spread among new mass occupations such as engineer-ing and teaching. Some of this filtered into other parts of the workforce — there were some comic attempts to 'profes-

sionalise' company management, more serious attempts to restructure some of the new labour processes by professionalising a fraction of workers such as technicians (for example, computer programmers) and reducing the rest to the status and pay of routine operatives. Most important of all, the doctrine of higher knowledge validating higher privilege was reinforced in the schools, where it was spread to the mass of working-class children, who until no cir-

cumstances could become professionals; and this helped confirm them in a new sense of their inferiority in the technological age and underscore the sense of dignity and equality that was one of the most important legacies of tradi-

tional radicalism.59

With the growing demand for administrative and welfare services, and in despite of the nominal policy of conservative governments, the numbers of public employees grew, the Commonwealth government at a brisker rate than others. By 1970, government employees totalled more than a million. With the scale of foreign intervention in Australian business, this created a striking situation: less than two-thirds of the Australian working class was actually directly employed by Australian enterprises. When this is taken together with the pervasive influence of wage regulation and welfare services,
it can be seen that class relations, to a very marked degree, had become indirect—mediated through the state and through international structures of ownership. With the elaboration of grades in administrative hierarchies, both public and private, the revival of margins in arbitration awards, the development of selective higher education as a means of controlled access to well-paid jobs, even the creation of status grades in suburban developments built by public authorities, the working class was coming increasingly to face in an environment of planned inequalities rather than inequalities produced directly by the labour market.43

The benevolence of these arrangements, by the late 1960s, was increasingly subject to doubt. Welfare conservatism, during the period when political opposition had willed, had been able to get away with some schemes that amounted to welfare frauds—notably a medical insurance scheme that subsidised the incomes of doctors and insurance companies, but was too costly for the groups who needed it most. If the administered labour market meant administered inequality, a number of groups were hardly able to use it at all: Aborigines, age pensioners, deserted wives and single mothers, and 'the unemployed'. The continued existence of such groups began to penetrate through the mists of the propaganda of affluence, as intellectuals began to talk again about 'the poor': estimates of their numbers ranged upwards to half a million. The invention of this social category is a telling sign of the extent of hegemony. In a series of political debates and official inquiries, it was accepted on all sides that there was a category of 'the poor' that was somewhere outside the social structure, and that the appropriate response was adjustments to pensions and social services rather than over the social structure that generated such a situation. By defining a 'poverty line'—essentially basic wage plus child endowment—the existing equilibrium in class relations was reproduced by the state welfare apparatus.

Militant Aborigines were the first to shift the argument to a more general ground, stressing the inherent racism of white Australian society. In the early 1970s the systematic reasons for poverty among women, institutional sexism and the dominance of the traditional family, were similarly pointed out by the new women's movement. Not until the rising unemployment of the mid-1970s, and the evident breakdown of the now traditional techniques of macroeconomic regulation, did the specifically capitalist character of a society that distributed income through the labour market come into focus.44

A period opening with a series of electoral defeats, and continuing with an increasing economic and domestic fragmentation of the working class and an increasing cultural strength of conservatives, was hardly propitious for labour politics. Its municipal base weakened and its parliamentary leadership unpopular, the Labor Party was unable either to chase or overcome the split of the mid-1950s. At one point in the late 1960s, it was not in office in any parliament in Australia, for the first time since before the First World War. The Communist Party staged some revival in the unions as the A.E.P. Industrial Groups were weakened and then disbanded. But within a few years, the industrialisation of office work from a newspaper advertisement intended to convey the office's efficiency.

Source: Australian, 29 October 1974.
years, it entered a period of internal disintegration with factional disputes among its leaders exacerbated by the shock-waves of the breakup of international communism. By the 1970s, nothing much remained but some left-wing ginger groups, perhaps one-sixth of the size of the party at its 1945 peak. But the Labor Party machine stayed in being; the D.L.P. was not followed out by other groups willing to form a new centre-party. The defensive strength of working-class organisation established in the previous generations was impressively demonstrated, as it also was by the unions. Their growth, in terms of coverage of the workforce, stopped and retreated slightly from the peak of the early 1950s, but they were aided by the high level of employment and the heavy imports of capital to keep a strong bargaining position. Even approximate stability in class shares of national production meant a rise in working-class incomes on average, though they were more unequally distributed between categories of workers.

When the Whitlam government eventually came to office, one socialist intellectual, who had himself suffered from the anti-communist hysteria of the 1950s, called it 'the end of the Ice Age'. Certainly, these two decades were a chill time for the Left. The attempts by Fabian socialists to work out a theory of parliamentary socialism petered out about the time of the split. Attempts in the following decade to reconstruct socialist ideas by Labor Party figures, notably J. F. Cairns, and marxist intellectuals set adrift by the break-up of the Communist Party, had little influence. A radical mobilisation broke out after the federal government sent troops to Vietnam in 1965, but suffered a stunning defeat in the 1966 election. Nevertheless this episode stored up trouble for the Liberals. Resistance to the war, based on a coalition of radical unionists and young professionals, notably students, stiffened after 1966 even though the Labor Party officially became more cautious, culminating in a campaign of illegal resistance to conscription that won wide underground support, and mass demonstrations, the Moratorium movement, on a new scale in 1970. The universities unexpectedly became a focus of dissent; and even some businessmen began to doubt the wisdom and morality of the war in Vietnam, though their attempts to split the Liberal Party failed. The 1966 election had also led to a new federal leadership which was a more formidable parliamentary opposition.47

The Whitlam leadership represented much more than a change in federal parliament, as it suggested by the emergence of similar leaderships in South Australia and eventually New South Wales and Victoria. It was the expression of a number of changes in the social bases of the party, which have already been indicated, and responded to the new situation in cautious but intelligent ways. From the 1940s there had been a definite decline in the occupational status polarisation of the vote, that is, the tendency for Liberal and Labor votes to split along white-collar/blue-collar lines. Labor was electorally depending far more on people who did not automatically think of themselves as working class, but who still had class interests that could be spoken to through the hegemonic language of modernism—as Whitlam did in expounding his urban policies. Not many white-collar unions had affiliated with the party, but their membership could be reached. The attempt was made easier by the increasing numbers of professionals and semi-professionals in the Labor leadership. There had of course been white-collar workers in the party before (including the two previous federal leaders); they now became the preponderant part, particularly after the 1969 election. And as the upper levels of the party changed, industrial workers were further cut off from organised political expression. In the early 1970s a dozen militant sets of marxist inspiration competed for their attention, but only the unions remained to them as an effective form of organisation.

The new leadership of the Labor Party accepted the constitutional bar against anything like socialism—a point Whitlam had made in a famous lecture in 1957—but devised ways to use the executive and planning powers of central government to rationalise capitalist development. Like the welfare capitalism of Menzies and the T.P.A. in the 1940s, it was a strategy that was being widely canvassed in other countries, and it struck gold, electorally, in Australia. Industrialisation and urban expansion by this stage had left a series of dislocations. It had rotted and polluted the inner suburbs, and created wide tracts of outer suburbs without elementary public services. It had expanded education and health services, but unequally, and as already noted had resorted 'pockets of poverty', as they were called, inadequately served by existing welfare measures. The policy of the Whitlam government essentially amounted to cleaning up the mess left by the long boom, financing the operation out of the profits of further growth. When a period of conflict in the ruling class undermined the Liberals, a coalition of the old unions, the new intelligentsia, and the outer-suburban working class was just strong enough to put Whitlam in office. It was not strong enough to keep him there for long.48

State and Ruling Class after Industrialisation

The techniques of conservative government in the boom are familiar. The unions competed to attract and subsidise corporate investment. Playford won the development stakes in the 1950s with an integrated 'new town' north of Adelaide called Elizabeth, floated on weapons research but supplied with a diverse manufacturing base in the 1960s. Bole followed with a huge industrial complex for the quiet semi-rural area around Westport. Queensland and Western Australia weighed in with the mining boom—though in the Pilbara at least the potential profits were so huge that some companies were prepared to build the necessary towns and railways themselves.

At the federal level, the government provided such direct services to capital as research, marketing aid, bounties and grants (mainly to rural capitalist: but more importantly, it provided guarantees of growth and stability. For the first, it held open the gates for immigrant capital as well as immigrant labour, with the effect of constantly increasing the scale of markets and total investment. For the second, it adopted policies intended to pacify and integrate the working class, providing a bed of comfort for the flower of capitalist accumulation. The most important point here was employment. The Labor government in a celebrated White Paper of 1945 formulated an objective of full employment, which the Liberals, after the ideological reconstruc-tion of the 1930s, accepted. Full employment, from a somewhat different point of view, had the happy effect of guaranteeing demand for consumer goods and the safety of the loan finance system. Unemployment was discovered to be unnecessary as a method of labour discipline when most of the workforce accepted wage regulation through arbitration; wage rates were constantly...
concealed, but also largely repressed through inflation of prices. The techniques of juggling credit and controls so as to produce full employment with modest inflation became a routinely accepted part of conservative government, to the point where McMahon could rise to be Prime Minister with his skill at this business as his main claim to the leadership. It was only when he had won it that the techniques broke down.64

Once the course had been set, the ship sailed on for a couple of decades with little more than administrative attention. It was as much top civil servants as ministers through whom Menzies and Playford governed; and this is the period when the upper levels of the Commonwealth bureaucracy became a corps d'élite who in many respects themselves were the holders of state power. As managers of the techniques of integration of the capitalist order, they developed channels of consultation with the business leadership—and often retired to a directorship or two when the days of labouring in the public interest were over. This is familiar in the modern capitalist state. Unlike the pattern in the United States, however, the Australian state bureaucracy remained insignificant in forming and promoting a socially integrative ideology, a task that remained with the parliamentarians until the spate of inquiries and commissions that followed the disclosures of the early 1970s.65

With the growth of companies of really massive size, the business leadership of the ruling class itself came more and more to resemble a bureaucracy. We have already noted the importance of salaried career managers in high-technology industries, and this pattern was also true of large retail and finance companies. (In some respects it was pioneered, in Australia, by the nineteenth-century banks.) Like shareholders, these men were dependent on the extraction of profits for their income, but here the profits were appropriated in the form of high salaries, and a fascinating and increasingly complex system of non-cash benefits—share options, company cars and houses, and many more ingenious schemes designed for tax avoidance. Combined with the increase in indirect ownership of companies via insurance firms, investment trusts, etc., which in effect gave prerogatives of ownership to the managers of these mediating firms, this reshaped much of the leadership of big business as a salaried elite, with gradations of income and power apparently continuous with those of technical and clerical workers. Echoes of the 'managerial revolution' thesis began to be heard.66

The reality beneath this was a highly centralised capitalism based on the undamaged rights of property. The actual numbers of companies grew to a remarkable extent: in 1969 there were nearly 150,000 companies registered in Australia, a few years later nearly 200,000. Most were small, often being private companies set up to conduct a modest business or to hold personal property for tax avoidance or concealment. In 1960, 39,000 recorded no profit. Major industries continued to be dominated by small numbers of large companies. Some, such as steelmaking, were outright monopolies; others, like oil-refining and banking, were controlled by tightly organised oligopolies.

The major companies had become very large, by pre-war standards, though they did not approach the scale of the biggest American and European firms. B.H.P. had a workforce of 35,000 in 1972, and a working capital of $1800 million. Other manufacturing companies had smaller, though still formidable, numbers: G.M.H. employed 26,000, Dunlop 24,000, A.C.I.

22 000, C.S.R. 16,000. A number of retailers and banks were in the same range: Woolworths with 34,000, Myer 29,000, Coles 28,000, A.N.Z. Bank 19,000, Bank of New South Wales 18,000. Some of these levies, such as Dunlop and Woolworths, had been created by a string of takeovers; others, such as B.H.P. and C.S.R., had sponsored a series of enterprises by diversification from a base in a single industry. Serious problems of co-ordination and complexities of ownership resulted. In a number of cases, there was a reorganisation of ownership into a holding company structure, with the actual business being done by subsidiaries, and the listed public company having no other function than that of ownership—asking a further step to the series of mediations through which property relations now passed.67

Worker militancy in heavy industry. An incident during the long strike at Ford's Broadmeadows car assembly plant.

The problems of co-ordination of enterprises on this scale, of controlling such numbers of workers, managing suppliers, markets, and governments, forced changes in the pattern of control in business. At earlier stages, companies were often effectively controlled by one or two men, often a general manager plus board chairman combination like the Lewis-Darling tandem in B.H.P., a drive for steel monopoly. It was still possible for individuals to hold considerable personal power, as did W. O. Bourke, who drove Ford towards market equality with G.M.H. in the late 1960s, or E. Dunsheen, who moulded Dunlop into a large conglomerate by a remarkable series of takeovers in the same period. Personal entrepreneurship is still characteristic of the small (albeit rich) firms that operated in the stockmarket boom; and where small companies grew rapidly, as for instance Ansett Transport Industries and Thomas Nationwide Transport, their managers could often retain personal power. Thus another wave of new men, such as Myer and Myer and Coles climbed into the top leadership of the ruling class, as the Myers, Perry and Coles had done before. But in the larger companies, personal entrepreneurship is no longer a feasible way of doing business, and here the appearance of a bureaucratic leadership has subsidence,
with a division of functions—control of production, personnel, marketing, finance, etc.—among a corps of career managers with relatively clear-cut lines of command. In some companies the devolution of power and formalisation of policy has become very marked, as in the American-owned car manufacturers which developed an elaborate committee structure within management, Chrysler going so far as to set formal goals for achievement by each executive. In such firms, of course, the bureaucracy is an international structure, and the term of office of any Australian manager is likely to be merely a segment of a career line that may reach over several continents.

The attempts to guarantee profit by rationalisation and long-term planning that are characteristic of this stage of capitalism go well beyond the individual firm. They amount practically to a system of inter-company planning. Price rings and agreements on restrictive practices are familiar and long-established features of Australian capitalism as devices to control competition and soak the consumer. In 1967–68, when a federal Trade Practices Act demanded registration, more than 10,000 restrictive agreements were registered within the year. There was now something more than that: a new tendency towards inter-company integration in making large investment decisions and operating the production facilities set up. The mining boom was the most conspicuous case. It would be tedious to list examples, but most of the big mining ventures of the 1960s and 1970s were established by consortia, often linking big local companies with the multinationals, and a number of big processing and manufacturing plants likewise. Such marriages have often used long-term loans from international capital markets, rather than share capital, as the main means of finance. Partly for this reason, partly because of the scale of investment itself, it has meant a close involvement with government in the planning of investment, a search for guarantees by the state. This generally has paid off for development-minded cabinets, and it has been common for large investment decisions to be announced, not by the companies, but by the local premier. With this mutual involvement in investment planning, and the extension of central economic control, added to traditional activities like wage regulation and lobbying, the care and maintenance of diplomatic relations between big firms and government has become one of the major activities of management—on both sides.69

It would be misleading—very badly misleading—to leave the impression that corporate capitalism has become one unified family at the top. On the contrary: this system of co-ordination, both through the state and outside it, is necessary precisely because of inhomogeneities and conflicts that are endemic in the system. Competition is not abolished, though some of its effects are mitigated in these ways and it has tended to take new forms. One is the competition within companies for the control of their administrative machinery, in which poor profitability can be decisive; another is the possibility of a takeover, which as T.N.T.'s attempt to swallow Amset in 1972 showed can affect quite large companies. Competition may also take the form of rivalry for the favours of a government which, for instance, controls mining leases. Pressure from international capital is always possible, even for so well-loved a local monopoly as Carlton and United Breweries, which found itself faced by the British-based Courage in much of Australian manufacturing, the preservation of tariff barriers against competition from imports is crucial to profitability: motor manufacturing is merely the best-known.70

For all its potency, direct foreign investment did not produce the kind of stratification in the ruling class that developed in those countries where local entrepreneurs became ‘compradore’ capitalists, essentially local agents of productive capital from overseas. Some local firms did fit into this role, including a good many brokers and merchant bankers, and some producers (such as Thiess) who supplied mining leases and local political connections to big multinationals (as in the Thiess Peabody Mitsui coal venture in Queensland). Foreign capital dominated the motor manufacturing and oil-refining complex. But local manufacturing and mining firms—B.H.P., C.S.R., Western Mining, A.C.I.—matched the scale of the largest foreign-owned manufacturers and miners. And finance, transport and retailing remained firmly in the hands of local capital, which was certainly not acting principally as agents of circulation for foreign-based producers.

The integration of international and local capital was more complex, in some ways more incestuous, than that. The joint ventures in mining have been mentioned. Two of the biggest ventures, B.H.P. and Western Mining, had at one time (between the wars) been majority owned in England, but the bulk of the capital had been repatriated—economic ownership could flow in and out of a given corporate structure. In 1976 the last of the British-based banks, which had been so important in Australian financial history, decided to shift its domicile to Melbourne. R.T.Z., no doubt largely for political reasons, sold shares in its mining companies and its local holding company (C.R.A.) on Australian stock exchanges—and on one occasion offered advance options on a share issue in a subsidiary company around a spectrum of Australian politicians, bureaucrats, journalists, and their wives. Specialised local industries as well as heavy industries might attract international buyers—this happened to most of the remaining Australian book publishers, not forgetting Cheshire, which has passed through several hands, including those of the Xerox Corporation of America and the British-based Longman. In short, international capital became enmeshed with the whole structure of Australian corporate business rather than forming a distinctive sector. Its managers, similarly, showed little tendency to form a socially distinct group in the Australian ruling class.71

It was this that made conflict over the inflow of foreign capital, when it did develop in a serious way at the end of the 1960s, very difficult for Menzies's successors to handle consistently. At the same time a number of other conflicts of interest within the ruling class deepened, coinciding with a period of factional conflict in the conservative political leadership. The result was a breakdown of business support for the Liberals and the advent of the Whitlam government. The turbulence of 1972–73 showed, among other things, how firm the structure of co-operation between central government and big business had become. Consultation on development went on, businessmen remained on the statutory corporations, and participated in a major inquiry on policy for manufacturing industry. Only in the mining field did an energetic minister make a serious attempt to control business operations, and that was partly directed to getting them higher prices overseas by means of 'resources diplomacy'. Coucey certainly caused friction, as did Whitlam's adventures with the tariff; and there were some attempts to mobilise business more generally against Labor in the mid-1970s. They failed. When the Labor Party in 1974 launched an appeal for $750,000 to build a national headquarters, it was publicly hacked by some of the most notable developers.
of the long boom: Sir Thomas Playford, Sir John McEwen, the chairman of Shell, the vice-chairman of C.R.A.—and the chairman of B.H.P. The government was destroyed with some co-operation from business, certainly, but not by a ruling-class mobilisation—simply an asset ruling-class coup.42

The Whitlam government was let in by a local episode in the world-wide turbulence of capitalism that began in the late 1960s. It proposed reform of some of the more obvious dislocations produced by the long boom, and it offered to the ruling class the possibility of integrating the organised working class into the political order during a difficult economic passage. The coalition was fragile, and had begun to break up before the coup: capitalists breaking away because of a squeeze on profits that began to bite in 1975,43 partly of the intelligentsia because the government proved unable to deliver on welfare reforms as its own financial and political difficulties deepened. Union support remained, though increasingly qualified; and at the moment of the coup, when there was a wave of anger in its working-class organisations and for a general strike in response, the Labor Party leadership sat on it. Fraser had judged the electoral climate better. His government represented a ruling-class retreat from the strategy of integration and hegemonic control. It began to take higher risks in rejecting the economic demands of the labour movement, though this was aided by a rising level of unemployment. It seems likely that this change will be carried through at the cost of a revived radicalism outside the major-party structure. What forms it might take are still unclear; but some developments in the union movement in the 1970s have foreshadowed new forms of opposition to corporate capitalism and its state: most notably the ‘green bans’ movement and its offspring, union opposition to the Newport power station and to the export of uranium; and the beginnings of a conscious movement for workers’ control of production which, significantly, has emerged within advanced manufacturing industry.

The hegemony of the industrial ruling class in the last generation was bought at a price: on the one hand, a closer integration with the state and with the networks of international business; on the other, an abandonment of a moral or pragmatic defence of capitalism, a justification by social prosperity rather than the old claim of the absolute rights of men of property. The combination worked with spectacular success for a generation; but it left the position of the ruling class more vulnerable to crisis, and Fraser is a child of that crisis.

Notes


2. For origins of the Collins House group, see M. Cannon, The Land Busters, M.U.P., Melbourne, 1966, pp. 131–8. For their move into mining and the operation of their international network, see G. Blainey, The Rush that Never Ended, M.U.P., Melbourne, 2nd edn, 1969, pp. 276–82; and W. S. Robinson, If I Remember Rightly, Cheshire, Melbourne, 1967 (see p. 41 for the comment on flotation quoted)—after The Steel Master, this is the most valuable inside account of the Australian ruling class in this period. For propagandist but useful illustrated narratives of the Collins House industrial projects, see M. H. Ellis, Metal Manufactures Limited: A Golden Jubilee History, Harper, Sydney, 1966; and E. Z. Reeves, 50 Years of Progress, Electrolytic Zinc, Holm, 1966. Their sprawling corporate structure fascinated pamphleteers, not only on the left; for a remarkable map of the interlocks, evidently meant as an investor’s aid, see A. P. Warren, The Kingdom of Collins House, Sydney, 1939.


5. There are no substantial changes in labour process or social relations in the workplace in Australian industrialisation: it is one of the great gaps in the history of the period. These remarks are based on fragments in a number of company histories already cited, which have pictures
of plants and workshop interiors and occasional descriptions of production processes; and more general sources such as P. Spearritt, ‘Women in Sydney Factories c. 1920–50’, in A. Curtinsoy et al. (eds), Women At Risk, Australian Society for the Study of Labour History, Canberra, 1975, pp. 31–46. By the 1940s, industrial production and machinery had begun to fascinate artists, as may be seen in publications such as Australian Photography 1947. Tenant’s observation is in Pozzi, Sydney, Sydney, Australian edn, 1946, p. 17. The change in industrial iconography can be traced in the glossy picture-packed company reports that now show forth at annual-general-meeting time from almost all the big companies (Woodworths, and the Collins House companies, are among the few to have maintained their earlier austerity). Contrast them, for instance, with the mid-Victorian image of the P. N. Russell engineering works shown in the illustration on page 133. For Lewis’s habits, see Bligh, Steel Masters, pp. 31–2, 71–6.


account of militancy and factional maneuvering in the 1920s. None of these studies has much evidence about the rank-and-file. Examples of the intellectual socialism of the 1940s are the N.S.W. Fabian Society pamphlets, especially Towards a Socialist Australia, Sydney, 1949 and K. Merz, R. Gibson and P. E. Maynard, A Fair Hearing for Socialism, Fabian Society, Melbourne, 1944; the latter is a reprint of lectures at St Paul's Cathedral in Melbourne arranged by Father Maynard, who had been a worker-priest in the Mt Morgan mine.


18. For typical samples of conservative thought in this period, not a notably ideological one, see such pamphlets as Constitutional Association of N.S.W. Writings such as A. S. A., 'The Right to Revolution, Sydney, ed. (1927), an attack on Lang business histories; autobiographies such as E. Page, Trust Sargon, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1963; D. Garwood, Sir Littleton Groom and the Deposition Crisis (1923), A Study of Non-Labor Response to Trade Union Militancy, Labour History, no. 32, 1977, pp. 46–84, is a good account of the way these themes frame.
tance”, *Politics*, vol. 3, 1998, pp. 41–54; and M. Gost, ‘Parties of Initiative and Resistance: A Reply’, *Politics*, vol. 4, 1999, pp. 42–99) essentially mistake a tactical situation, fairly common in the period 1950–80, for the basic structure. The strategic situation in this period was ruling-class mobilisation; this sometimes involves resistance to Labor policy ‘initiatives’, certainly, but also involved ‘initiatives’ by the conservatives such as those listed in the text. And when the ruling-class reorganisation of the 1940s got under way, the tactical initiative in party conflict generally passed to the conservative parties.

19. Brownlee et al., ‘Women Through the Depression’, provide useful evidence of its differential impact; Kingston, *My Wife…* traces the steep decline of domestic service after the depression, which may have contributed to the changing social consciousness that found political expression in the 1940s. Figures on employer organisations are given in the annual Labour *Report* in this period; the quotation is from the 1922 *Report*, p. 15. For statements by prelates on repatriation, see L. J. Louis and L. Turtur (eds), *The Depression of the 1930s*, Camerl, Melbourne, 1968, pp. 70–5; for a sketch of Catholic anti-communism in the 1930s, J. G. Marshall, *Australia: The Catholic Church, Angers & Robertson*, Sydney, 1955, pp. 167–8; for its political context, D. Watson, ‘Anti-communism in the Thirties’, *Amer*, no. 30, 1975, pp. 40–51, who convincingly argues it was a product of genuine fear and confusion and not just red-scare electioneering.


25. For detailed narratives of these events, see L. C. Webb, *Communism and Democracy in Australia*, Cheshire, Melbourne, 1934; and R. Murray, *The Split*, Cheshire, Melbourne, 1970. Murray gives an extraordinarily detailed account of the factional politics of the Labor Party, but is unable to grasp the whole matter theoretically—when it comes to the decisive event, Evatt’s open attack on the Movement in October 1944, he has to fall back on mental instability, as an explanation! I. Campbell, ‘A.I.P. Industrial Groups—A Reassessment’, *A.I.P.H.*, vol. 3, 1962, pp. 183–99, has balancing remarks on the tactical errors of the groupers, and interesting evidence of financial support of their activities by business.
26. The shift is traced by A. Watt. *The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy, 1938-1965*, C.U.P., London, 1967; this book itself is an interesting document of cold-war ideology in the upper levels of the civil service. For the political view, see P.C. Spender. *Exercise in Diplomacy*, S.U.P., Sydney, 1969. The major divergences from American line were Robert Biss (see *Menzies, Afternoon Light*, pp. 149-85) and West Irian, both issues to do with rival Western imperialisms.


38. On this process of mini-canisation, see R. D. Williams, *White-collar Unions*, in P. W. D. Matthews and G. W. Ford, *Australian Trade Unions*, Sun, Melbourne, 1968, pp. 146–64; J. I. Martin, in *Class Identification and Trade Union Behaviour*, *Journal of Industrial Relations*, vol. 7, 1965, pp. 131–48; disputes the view that white-collar unions are less political than blue-collar unions, but it can hardly be denied that they are generally less class-conscious.


45. The major study of the bureaucratic elite is Enzel, Equality and Authority, see also J. Playford, Neo-capitalism in Australia, Arena, Melbourne, 1969, on relationships with business. G. Caiden, The Commonwealth Bureaucracy, M.U. P., Melbourne, 1967, is the orthodox survey of organisation; B. Judery, At the Centre, Cheshire, Melbourne, 1974, has much more detail of internal politics and the readjustments of the early 1970s.


47. For company numbers and profits, see Commonwealth Taxation Assessments 1967–79, Bulletin no. 9, pp. 37, 42. The figure for B.H.P.'s capital represents funds employed. On workforces, see Annual Reports for the 1970s as companies named; not all companies give this information, but it is becoming increasingly common. Examples of holding company structure in the Top 50 are Woolworth (1949); Olympic (1953); C.B.A. (1962—the biggest); Johns Perry (1960); M.I.M. (1970). Carboon and United Beverages is an interesting inversion—until its corporate reorganisation in 1973, the merged breweries had in effect been holding companies in it.


49. On restrictive agreements, commissioner of Trade Practices, Fourth Annual Report, Canberra, 1971, p. 15; for a general review of such in the 1960s, see A. Hunter, 'Restrictive Practices and Monopolies in Australia', Economic Record, vol. 37, 1961, pp. 25–52. As one example of the joint venture, all the major companies in the aluminium industry except Alcan are owned by consortia; see The Australian Aluminium Industry, aluminium Development Council, Sydney, n.d. (1969?), p. 4. The most massive consor- tium project of all, a proposed nine-company 'jumbo' steel plant in Western Australia, seems to have failed, though something new may now may develop in the Pilbara.

50. For accounts of some of the takeover struggles, see 'The Takeover Specialists', Australian, 15 April 1972; 'The Deal of a Lifetime', Daily Telegraph,


53. There is dispute over what actually happened to shares of national income, but it may be presumed that the view argued by R. A. Price, *The Effect of the Government’s Economic Policies on Industry, 1973–1975*, *Australian Quarterly*, vol. 48, no. 2, 1976, pp. 81–94, that there was a redistribution of income that “caused a severe profit slump and exacerbated the critical capital shortage” was at least widely believed by capitalists in 1975. Price works for the Victorian Chamber of Manufactures.