THE WORKERS' PARTY

Foreword.

The working-class movement in Australia is faced with the increasing acuteness of the struggle, a worsening of conditions, and the dangers of Fascism and war. These conditions call for an active and intelligent revolutionary lead. This manifests itself in the necessity to show that such a revolutionary lead does not come, and can no longer be expected to come, from the Communist Party, which, in its frantic efforts to retain legality, evades the struggle at every point.

The bureaucracy of the Communist Party makes it impossible for a revolutionary opposition to function any longer within the Party; the slightest evidence of militant activity and the stirring up of mass actions is met by the publication of further pamphlets and a campaign of abuse.

Only by the formation of a new party can a lead be given to the masses. THE WORKERS' PARTY calls on the masses for active struggle, and already, in associating itself with the Batack Defence Committee, is organizing revolutionary mass action. The case of the Workers' Party is here presented to all militant workers as a rallying ground for struggle.

SPECIAL NOTE

...The contents of this document are an elaboration of the decisions arrived at during a conference held by various groups on 13th, 14th, and 21st of May 1933.

...While realizing that this analysis is incomplete, more especially in view of recent momentous happenings in the International arena; this is in no way a defection. The new Secretary of the Workers' Party (Left Opposition) proposes to remedy this at an early date by the publication of further pamphlets.

The crushing of the German working-class organizations under the heel of Fascism shown in detail by the criminal collapse of the Commintern to give a decisive lead to the German Party, the surrender to pacifism at the World Congress Against War in Amsterdam; the statements of the Soviet Delegation at the World Economic Conference; and further proof to the contention that the teachings of Lenin have been distorted by the present Stalinist bureaucracy into a utopian theory of establishing Socialism in one country, with a consequent sacrifice of International revolutionary struggle.

In the next future we shall endeavor to present to the workers of Australia, a complete and full analysis of the international situation up to date, in order that a correct ideological basis may be laid for the development of a real revolutionary movement in this country.

THE PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION.

The world-wide character of the crisis has undoubtedly intensified the conflict among the several big capitalist powers, and between the capitalist powers and Soviet Russia, over a redistribution of the sources of raw materials and of the available markets. Already the capitalist world has been neatly divided among the capitalist powers of Great Britain, U.S.A., France and Japan. All countries are either directly controlled by, or under the domination of, one or other of these great powers. Japanese imperialism, owing to its late growth, its lack of resources, (coal, iron ore), and the far-reaching effects of the depression on primary and secondary industry, feels more than the other powers the need for new sources of raw materials. Japanese imperialism is the aggressive force that menace peace, and extends its influence over China as the most logical outlet for its restricted development. But here Japanese imperialism comes into conflict with Soviet Russia. The influence of the Soviet in Manchuria, the half-interest in the Chinese Eastern Railway, are obstacles to Japanese progress. The policy of the Soviet Government is claimed to be one of non-aggression, but that of Japan must be the opposite. Having gained control of Manchuria, the next step is into Siberia. At what stage war breaks out is to be determined by the extent to which the Soviet Government is willing to retreat before Japanese imperialism.

ON WHAT BASIS WILL THE CAPITALIST POWERS UNITE AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION?

With the exception of Japan, it cannot be said that any of the other powers are menacing Soviet territory. As far as a conflict of trade between, Russia has shown herself only too willing to provide a
MARKET for the product of heavy industry from the capitalist coast. Certainly conflict exists owing to the need for Russia paying for these imports by primary products when the world's markets are already glutted with foodstuffs. But the main trade of the Soviet is carried on with Central European countries which need Russian exports. True, Russian steel comes into conflict with the English and American product, but if the possibility of building a self-contained Socialist State in Russia is excluded, then conflict will tend to die out as the need for trade with the capitalist countries becomes less.

The only basis on which the capitalist powers would be forced to unite against the Soviet Union, would be by the development of the international revolutionary movement to such an extent as to become a menace to world capitalism. The activities of the Soviet Government in building the Communist Parties in the capitalist countries, would undoubtedly, in view of the present climate, have caused an extraordinary movement in the world overt, to a degree that might precipitate an attack on the Soviet Union. But this is not the policy of the Communist International. The policy of the C.I. is that of “Socialism in one country.” The Soviet workers organize through their own government, that they will not interfere in the “internal affairs of the capitalist countries.” Assistance of the Soviet workers in the struggles of the German workers, for instance, would undoubtedly result in a rupture of the trade agreement between the two countries, and consequently be detrimental to the Second Five-Year Plan.

It is this contradiction between the line of “Socialism in one country” and the aim of Socialism in all countries followed by the Communist Parties, that is responsible for the retarded growth of the Communist Parties in the capitalist countries, and for the development of “left-opposition parties.”

AFFECTS OF THE CRISIS WITHIN THE BRITISH EMPIRE.

While the maintenance of tariff barriers in Australia, Canada etc., against British manufacturers, indicates the conflict between these parts of the Empire, there have nevertheless been strenuous attempts to provide closer cohesion (Ottawa etc.).

In Australia, the influence of British imperialism remains dominant. The struggle of the local financial and manufacturing interests, (struggles between the landowners representing N.S.W. manufacturing interests and the Federal Government representing interests of British imperialism and the big primary producers), has resulted in a temporary victory for British imperialism, but not without making concessions to the local capitalists in order to win their support. (Maintenance of tariffs).

We have witnessed a hardening of the power of British financial interests in Australia to a greater unity against the weaker a definite drive for more power to the Federal Govt. The greater portion of Australia’s trade is carried on with Great Britain. British capital is heavily invested in Australia. The general concern is that through the development of the crisis will come a weakening of the power of the small manufacturer, and through the greater centralization of capital a more severe struggle, with an end to both free competition and parliamentary influence on industry. This will mean eventually sweeping aside the Marxist traditions and customs (introduction of Fascism).

INCORRECTNESS OF THE THEORY OF SOCIAL FASCISM.

Recent events have shown that organised social-democracy has now become an obstacle to the development of Fascism. (Attacks upon social-democratic organisations in Germany. Interference toward Labor Party by Fascist elements in Australia.)

While it is correct to state that for a period the social democratic parties and the Trade Unions in a number of countries assumed the role of crisis parties of the capitalist state, the situation is now altered. Supporting the theory that it was possible to reform capitalism in the interests of the workers, the social democratic parties in the early stages of the present crisis acted radically enough as a bolster for capitalism. It is true that there was a tendency for the Labor Party and the Trade Unions to play a increasingly important part in the capitalist state apparatus, but such a situation could only be fraught with grave danger to capitalism.
The failure of the Labor Party to relieve the effects of the crisis upon the workers brought about an increasing disillusionment among them that would have eventually resulted in movements menacing the Capitalist State itself. Also, the petit-bourgeois and small manufacturing elements supporting the Labor Party soon lost confidence in the ability of that party to protect their interests, and were forced over to the support of the U.A.F.

In N.S.W. the Labor Party lost office because social democracy had by that time shown that it was no longer capable of stabilizing the system, and that it had become in fact, an enemy to the further maintenance of capitalism. While it was correct to state that social democracy paved the way for Fascism, inasmuch as a social democratic body, a number of countries, provided the introduction of forms of open bourgeois dictatorship; it was incorrect to believe that the mass social democratic organizations of the workers could be gradually hardened into permanent organs of the capitalist state.

The fact that the Labor Party now lacks support from many considerable sections of the bourgeoisie, and the fact that the basis of reformism has now been destroyed, (owing to the crisis making it impossible, in the main, for capitalism to grant concessions to the workers without molesting the system), forces the leadership of the Labor party and the Trade Unions to make the choice, either of fighting for the continuance of social democracy, (which is becoming more and more discredited daily, and yet is an obstacle to the more wanton pursuits of Fascism), or of openly linking up with the U.A.F. (Lyons and others chose the latter course, Lang and Garden the former).

This is not to suggest that we can expect a different line from the Labor Party leaders from that previously followed. They will still fulfill the role of misleading the workers by advocating constitutional action against Fascism and for the saving of democracy, and as such, constitute a brake upon the revolutionary struggles of the workers.

THE REASON FOR THE SLOWING DOWN IN THE TENDENCY OF THE ATTACK AGAINST THE COMMUNIST PARTY.

The intensive propaganda against the Party prior to the last elections, the activities of the New Guard and the subsequent framing of anti-communist legislation, was partially due to an attempt to influence large sections of the petit-bourgeoisie, industrialists, and the backward sections of the workers against the Lang administration which was detrimental to imperialist interests, and partially as preparation for coming attacks on the working class. That the drive against the Party was temporarily dropped, was, and is, due to its continual retreat before the capital offensive, and to the absence of any large spontaneous strike movements, or movements under the control of the social democrats.

THE REASON FOR THE GROWTH OF AN OPPOSITION WITHIN THE PARTY.

The development of an opposition, which has taken place almost spontaneously in widely separated areas and without any co-ordination between individuals; the extraordinary growth of numerous factions and groupings within the Party; has been due to the development of attacks against the workers ni and from a crisis arising from a condition never before experienced by the workers of this country.

The increased radicalization of the workers has resulted in a revolt on the part of the revolutionaries against obvious right-opportunism. On the other hand, the political confusion existing among the petit-bourgeois elements has been reflected within the Party in the formation of vacillating and hesitating groups. A factor that is not insignificant, is the desire of opportunists who have gained some measure of economic security in these treacherous times -- in the Party and fraternal organizations -- to maintain a peaceful existence.

It cannot be denied that the existence of factionalists within the Party offers a golden opportunity to agitate-provocateur to weaken the movement. The opportunity for agitate-provocateur to gain admittance, and distort the line of the Party is enhanced by the expulsion of many experienced members, and the ease with which new members are allowed to gain important positions.
THE PRESENT POSITION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

What is the matter with the Communist Party? Why is it, that at a time when the discontent of the workers is expressed more openly, and they show an increasing willingness to struggle, that the influence of the Party is on the wane?

Why is there such a great disproportion between the Party's organizational and ideological influence?

In the following pages we will attempt to answer these questions, and show by a clear analysis of the situation, that the struggle of the workers are being retarded owing to the opportunism of the leadership of the party that professes to develop and lead these struggles. We will also attempt to show by a comparison of the tactics of the Central Committee of the Communist Party with the objective situation, how and why the party has failed to win the leadership of the masses, and what could be achieved by concrete leadership and fearless mass work.

In order to present our case as clearly as possible, we will first of all deal with...

THE LOSS OF INFLUENCE BY THE PARTY

The number of votes cast for Communism in the State elections of N.S.W. 1932, to a certain extent, be taken as an indication of the ideological influence of the Party.

While the Party polled approximately 13,000 votes in the aggregate, we can only take about 3000 of these from which to formulate an accurate analysis of the influence of the Party. That is to say, that in order to arrive at a true estimation of the Party's ideological influence, we can only make a comparison between the votes obtained in those electorates that were contested in both elections. (1930-32). For instance, the 1930 votes polled by the Party candidate in Cessnock were taken into consideration, as no Labour candidate stood for that electorate. The following table will show the increase and decrease in the electorates that were contested at both elections...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electorates</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1932</th>
<th>Gain</th>
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<th>Total</th>
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<td>Anna Vale</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>197</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrawarra</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>193</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulga</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>84</td>
<td></td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bungarri</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>153</td>
<td></td>
<td>626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burrawang</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>105</td>
<td></td>
<td>489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bungaree</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cessnock</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
<td>340</td>
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<tr>
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<td>166</td>
<td>746</td>
<td>580</td>
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<td>1326</td>
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<tr>
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<td>134</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
<td>306</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gunnedah</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td>617</td>
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<tr>
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<td>135</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Jamison</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>276</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marrickville</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>56</td>
<td></td>
<td>192</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>272</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>553</td>
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<tr>
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<td>128</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
<td>296</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phillip</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Belford</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>64</td>
<td></td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bega</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td>377</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bulli</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>156</td>
<td></td>
<td>906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cessnock</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>807</td>
<td>393</td>
<td></td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>152</td>
<td></td>
<td>478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illawarra</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>117</td>
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<td>578</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kalang</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>324</td>
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<td>876</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kurri</td>
<td>816</td>
<td>492</td>
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<td>Maitland</td>
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<td>Newnomain</td>
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<td>331</td>
<td>156</td>
<td></td>
<td>506</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sturt</td>
<td>689</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
<td>1318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taree</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>121</td>
<td></td>
<td>447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>8753</td>
<td>6673</td>
<td>2080</td>
<td></td>
<td>15426</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: These figures are the final figures published in the S.M.N. 3/4/32. They do not include postal votes. ...
It is significant that where the Party has been established for a long period, as in places like DUNSTON, REDfern, ARNANDALE, AUBURN, LAKEMENA, and KOGARAH (Sydney), CHILDHURST, HAMILTON and MANSFIELD, actual losses are recorded. It is no argument to say that the Party vote was greatly increased in certain country areas, for the Party had not been established long enough in these areas for its upper line to be recognised.

LOSES OF INFLUENCE IN FRATERNAL ORGANISATIONS.

Party influence in the fraternal organisations is also on the wane. The U.W.R., which once embraced thousands of workers is now out of existence, and has not been replaced by any one mass organisation or by Party-Faction work in the existing social democratic organisations. Nor has any real attempt been made to set up unemployed committees on a mass scale.

Other fraternal bodies, such as the Workers International Relief, F. & T. League, and the Workers Labour Defence and Minority Movement are stagnating. The membership of the Friends of the Soviet Union is declining and the Poetical Workers Union has lost a small membership in spite of good objective conditions for development. Other fraternal bodies which have existed on paper only cannot be considered.

PARTY'S OFFICIAL REPORT SHOW DECLINE IN INFLUENCE.

The greatest proof of the Party's declining influence is contained in the organisation report of the District Committee submitted to the October Conference 1932. In this report it was stated that the strength of the Party in Mr. 1 District was 1040, and of the combined strength of the Party and branches, 1000, which figure includes a membership of 200 Party members in Mr. 1 District, and gives that date the figures for Mr. 1 District have declined still further. It must be remembered also that only a small percentage of the Party membership is ever really active.

ORGANISATIONAL WEAKNESS

While the decline of ideologcal influence among the masses is very apparent, nevertheless, the influences still remaining is gradually being lost owing to the Party's failure to organisationally crystallise that influence.

The organisational weakness of the Party is exposed by the fact that only a few hundreds of the votes cast for Communism have been won to membership of the Party. If we examine the figures of some of the more industrialised areas, we shall find definite proof of this.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electorate</th>
<th>Votes for Communist Party and Fraternal Organisations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bankstown</td>
<td>446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leichhardt</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only about 10% in Party or Fraternals. No Party activity. No fraternal.

Such areas as Brimbank and Maribyrnong with Communist votes of 115 and 122 respectively, are allowed to remain dormant. Similar conditions can be said to exist to a greater or lesser degree throughout the State, and indeed, throughout the whole of Australia.

(Election figures quoted do not include postal votes)

DEMONSTRATIONS 1932

The falling off in the numbers attending demonstrations is a further proof, not only of waning influence, but of organisational weakness. On May 1st, 1932, a careful check gave the number as 800. (About these Methodists in Mr. 1 District according to the report of the March 1932.)

Despite being banned, the demonstration on August 1st 1932 was well attended, but owing to the confusion brought about by the lack of an organised plan, and the fact that the leaders to lead nothing was achieved, and the party lost prestige in the eyes of the workers. On November 7th 1932 the chance of plan at the last minute also caused confusion, and the demonstration was a failure. The failure of August 1st and November 7th were reflected in the attendance at International Unemployed Day, Feb. 27th, 1933, which although better organised around popular demands, only succeeded in attracting a few hundred of workers.

...6
WORK IN UNITS

While the number of factory units is said to have increased, the work they indulge in is organizing study circles and selling papers, at intervals a list of whitewash to spread around in the form of slogans, but no real mass work is undertaken. The Socialist Competition papers have been completed on April 1st, 1933, to the task of organizing new factory units and increasing the number of the "Red Leader" and "Worker" Weekly. The assumption of an improvement in mass work cannot enter into a comparison of this nature.

WEAKNESS IN VARIOUS STRUGGLES.

In the struggles that have occurred, Glass Workers, Wool Workers, Textile Workers, the Party has not been able to exercise any appreciable influence. Indeed, as divorced from the struggle was the N.U.W. that the Glass Workers disputes had been on for two days before the N.U.W. knew about it! And this despite the fact that their central office was a short distance from the scene of trouble. When the Young Communist League (Diasoria as the N.U.W.) eventually appeared on the scene, the strikers repudiated them.

The organizational weakness of the Party was never more apparent than during the Questionnaire struggle, the campaign was not planned, and the spontaneous outbreaks which occurred in several districts (Confield, Lithgow, Broken Hill, Gisborne) were not coordinated. At the height of the campaign, when there was an opportunity of extending it, the party vacillated, and the enthusiasm of the unemployed for the struggle was allowed to abate. A plan of campaign put forward by a lower party organ advocating the organizing of a series of synchronized meetings throughout the Metropolitan area in order to break down police concentration, was termed "anarchist" by the leadership of the Party, and those who put it forward were dubbed "anarchists".

In the foregoing paragraphs we have briefly outlined the facts showing the loss of influence and organizational weakness of the Party. We will now proceed to deal with the causes of these weaknesses.

While the fundamental cause must be traced to the political errors of the Party leadership, with which we dealt last year, the immediate cause can be discovered within the Party itself, and can be dealt with under the heading of...

THE ABUSE OF DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM.

The weakness of the Party in mass work is only a reflex of inner Party weaknesses. The abuse of democratic centralism by the present leadership, which takes the form of a complete stifling of criticism, has developed in the Party, especially in the "silent middle" of the Party, and makes for unity in the lower party organs in an atmosphere of "disruption" and "anarchism", and those who have the temerity to express their opinions are summarily expelled and branded as anti-working class.

At the District Conference in 1932, criticism of the Exam. Board’s recommendations, although invited, was termed disruption and the gag applied. (Kirk, and Herring). At the 1932 Xmas Party held in Sydney Xmas 1932, the criticism presented by the Melbourne delegates was termed "leftist" and withdrawn; under pain of exclusion. At the Section Conference held in No.1 District in 1932, the cut and dried nature of the proceedings was evident. The Exam. Boards, picked by the Section Committee under the supervision of the D.C., were composed of strong supporters of the D.C. Any potential opposition was intimidated by questions being put as a demand for those against to state their names. Those speaking in opposition were shut down and their criticism distorted by the D.C. representatives.

At the D.C. Conference held in Melbourne, Feb. 1933, to deal with Jackson & Co, the working of a fraction in support of the Central Committee was evident, and worked successfully by the simple method of eliminating known factions supportive of the conference. The resolution passed by the Port Melbourne Section in August 1932 was responsible for the expulsion of those who supported it. Similar resolutions passed by the Railways Section (Vic.) at the same time were only rescinded under threat of expulsion.
A criticism of the C.C., prepared by Morts Dock Unit, (Sydney), was responsible for the expulsion of Sylvester and numerous others in Balmain who supported it. Other prominent members of the Party, Wilson, (8-Sydney Section), Batty (Parramatta Section), Etono (Banksstown), and Hitchins, (South Coast) were expelled for criticism of the leadership made at unit meetings and conferences.

A similar condition exists in the Young Communist League of Australia, L.Court (Sydney) and Dick Battoo, (Banksstown), being particular examples of how critics of the leadership are dealt with. On the other hand, plenty of criticism is allowed as long as it doesn't damage the prestige of the leading organs. The columns of the Party paper with self-criticism. W. Orr, who has at conferences and through the "W.N." indulged in soothing and correct criticism of the Party failures, always finds something to do anything to overcome the mistakes he is criticizing, and he thus himself guilty of the worst form of opportunism.

"Right-opportues" is a favourite cry of the leadership in order to whitewash their own hands. Examples of this are the expulsions of Jackson and Co., as "right-opportunist" and criticism of right-opportunist in South Australia. (W.N. May 3rd, 1933).

"Left-opportunist" is also severely condemned by the leadership, itself guilty of some of the most glaring leftist errors under the influence of the C.C. representative, (Banksstown and Newtown evictions, attack on Trades and Labor Council delegates, etc.)

RESPONSIBILITY FOR MISTAKES PLACED ON INDIVIDUALS.

When it becomes absolutely necessary for mistakes to be admitted, they are fastened on to individual members.

PERON has been accused of numerous errors including errors in the early days of the unemployed agitation in Melbourne, although he was under the control of the Polit-bureau of the Party at all times.

SHAYLON & Co. These comrades were charged with mistakes in the 4th District, although not publicly. Wilson was accused of being responsible for the mistakes on the waterfront and was withdrawn. (Since when the International Seamen's Club has closed down.)

MCKENZIE was accused of turning the U.W.M. into an organization for fighting the class struggle through the capitalist courts.

JACKSON & Co. After the expulsion of these comrades the mistakes of District 4 were placed on their shoulders.

TRIPP & Co. were made to take the blame for the failure of the P.U.S.W. demonstration on Nov. 6th, 1932.

The fact that the Department to the Government "took too much time" is said to be the reason that the arrangements for the demonstration on Feb. 27th (International Unemployed Day) were not carried out. As a matter of fact, all the mistakes of the Party can be traced to the opportunism which manifests itself in the C.C. in the failure to adequately combat opportunism throughout the whole Party.

THE LINE OF THE C.C. HAS CHANGED FROM A "LEFT-SECTARIAN" TO A RIGHT-OPPORTUNIST LINE.

From the period of 1929 to the last State elections of June 1932, the line of the Party was marked by rigid sectarianism. In their propaganda work among the masses the individual Party members were overbearing and insulting.

This sectarianism was very apparent in the fraternal organisations. The U.W.M. was regarded as a section of the Party, and the lecturers sent around the U.W.M. Halls and meetings were mostly Party members, and their subjects were not connected with the needs of the workers, and indeed did not deal with any concrete questions at all but the class struggle in the abstract. The same conditions existed in other organisations which were formed at the same time were formed to spread the Party doctrine and to overcome the arguments of their opponents by branding them as "Social-Fascists" and "anti-workingclass".

To show how this sectarian line was supported by the C.C., reference can be made to the article appearing in the "W.N." May 6th, 1932, wherein it was stated that certain expelled members of the Party should not be allowed to enter the halls of the fraternal organisations.
About the time of the N.S.W. election of June 1932 the result of sectarianism became apparent in the attacks that took place on Party candidates by social democratic supporters. (Millers Point, Surry Hills, Auburn."

Nowadays great pains are taken to show that the fraternal organisations are not connected with the Party. The members of the Anti-war Executive are spoken of as "Militants" instead of "Socialists". (\[W.W.S.5/33\]). The Workers Sports Federation develops merely as a bourgeois Sports Club in which no mention of Communism is allowed. The Party platform in the Referendum campaign was open to all as long as they were prepared to oppose the government. It was not demanded that they should support the Party attitude towards the Referendum.

At the Anti-war Conference held in the Adyar Hall, April 6th 1933, placard speakers went unchallenged and were echoed by a leading Party member, Nugent, who said that "war was a question for humanity, not for the working class alone"

The Party co-operates with, yet fails to attack, the opportunist Chairman of the A.N.U. and Campbell of the A.I.P. Globe Break-away section, and others of the same type. The Party has ceased to oppose the opportunism of the Labor Party leaders through the columns of the "Workers Weekly". We are told in the issue of May 9th 1933, "that a successful Committee has been formed in the Referendum campaign, composed of equal representation from the C.P. and the A.I.P."

APPENDAGE OF RIGHT-OPPORTUNISTS TO LEADING POSITIONS.

One of the most outstanding examples of the opportunism of the C.P. has been the appointment to leading positions of members with comparatively little experience in the struggle. With the important task of building the Party in the industries, and the need for gaining the confidence of the workers in the everyday struggles, we would expect to find those who had proved themselves occupying the leading positions. But not so! Party members who have distinguished themselves in actual struggles, in agitation, in conferences, demonstrations and industrial activities, and general work, are usually given to petit-bourgeois types. (Arora, Devanney, Nugent, etc.). In N.S. District, proletarian types like Jackson, Andrews, etc., are replaced by individuals like Burns and O'Dwy. These are hardly examples. Throughout the whole Party there has been a decided move to fill all important posts with right-opportunist, of whom there are many going to the conditions under which the Party has grown.

The following is a brief analysis of the present position of the Party and its weaknesses, but in order to arrive at a complete understanding of the fundamental cause of these weaknesses, and their relation to the international revolutionary situation in general, it is necessary to deal exhaustively with the political errors of the C.P. and their relation to the Communist International.

THE POLITICAL ERRORS OF THE C.P. OF A. AND THEIR RELATION TO THE C.I.

The political errors of the C.P. of the C.P. of A. must be studied in relation to its general political line. This line will be understood, not by accepting the 'tenets of policy issued through the W.W.S.' or made by leading Party members, but by examining the concrete work of the Party in all spheres of activity over a sufficient period of time to ensure that our observations are generally correct.

(1) THE PRESENT LINE OF THE C.P. OF A.

The C.P., as has been shown in the foregoing, has swung from a left-sectarian to a right-opportunist line. This means the acceptance of the World Crisis, the advent of World Capitalism. The previous over-estimation of the Crisis, which was responsible for exaggerated and distorted application of the line of independent leadership of the workers, and for the activity which the Labor Party was regarded as responsible for the introduction of Fascism, isolated and discredited the Party among the workers, and provided a basis for the extraordinary growth of the left-wing in the membership, when the revolutionary wave, expected to begin in Germany and end in Australia, failed to materialise.

This development now characterises the whole line of the Party, since the policy is that it should function only as a part of a united front with the fraternal organisations and the A.I.P., in which its independent identity will be obscured, while verbally maintaining an opposition to Fascism, the C.P. is here adopting a reformist line.

The acceptance of the indefinite stabilisation of World Capitalism means the acceptance of the indefinite partial abolition of Australian Capitalism, and thus of the approach of a period in which it
Ill be possible to win small concessions from the capitalists. At the same time, it does in practice, in spite of denials, the inevitability of Fascism in Australia and other countries.

The essence of the independence of the Party and the capitulation to Fascism follows directly from the line of Socialism in one country, which is accepted, not only by the C.C. but by the C.I., and which is only possible with continued stabilization of capitalism. Any immediate and sudden deepening of the crisis is, in this view, out of the question, and it is implied that the best thing that the Australian and other parties can do for the time being is to establish the workers concerning conditions in the Soviet Union. That this is generally accepted by the C.C. of A. is shown by the following facts:

a. The prominence given to F.O.S.U. propaganda in the "W.W."

b. The important place given to the F.O.S.U. in Party work.

c. The fact that without exception, the students returning from the Soviet Union have only one idea of maintaining the revolution, and that is by spreading propaganda about the conditions in Russia.

d. The setting up of anti-war committees to support the peaceful development of the Soviet Union, without any connection with local struggles.

The policy of the C.C. has thus as its two main features a verbal demand for a united front against capitalism and an actual decline to a servile position. This vacillation and defeatist policy is connected, as has been shown, with the subordination of the World Revolution to the building of Socialism in one country, and in further exemplified in the Party's attitude toward illegality.

(2) THE EVOLUTION OR THE ILLIGALITY DANGER

The policy of the C.C. in regard to illegality has also combined an actual retreat from struggle with a pretense at maintaining a revolutionary front. It has resulted:

a. In the declination of the leadership from the rank and file of the Party's work being tampered with, such as the freeing of prominent members of the C.C. instead of the building of an alternative leadership of the party composed of names unknown to the authorities as leading Party members.

b. In a frantic campaign of expulsions in order to maintain a united Party front against the attacks of the bourgeoisie.

c. In the almost complete dropping of independent work. (United front instead of Party methods.)

d. In a complete denial of Bolshevik self-criticism and democratic centralism.

The C.C. took up the attitude that the Party was entering a period of crisis when it was necessary to maintain an iron discipline, and unswerving loyalty and confidence in the C.C. was demanded. Actually this demand for loyalty was a demand to mold the C.C. to "protect" itself and the Party from the bourgeoisie, by watering down the Party policy.

It can be understood that in a period of crisis, when a revolutionary party in being attacked from all sides and being driven underground, it would be necessary for instructions to be issued and carried out without the rank and file of the Party fully understanding the reasons for such instructions. Moreover, except for the purpose of discipline, the best manner of putting them into effect, such instructions would be carried out without discussion. But such a position is only possible with a leadership which has gained experience in the struggle that has the confidence of the rank and file; and that maintains contact with it however difficult this may be; and continually takes into consideration the experience and opinions of the lower organs of the party and of individual members.

What will be the result, when a leadership, long isolated from the struggle, looking outside, that has failed to win the confidence of the workers--or has even lost contact with any considerable section of them in the days of legal development of the Party--finds itself confronted with the possibility of illegality?

UNITED

An overestimation of the danger!

A mechanical attempt to apply a very theoretical knowledge of illegal

work!
A decided tendency to liquidate the Party in order to provide an excuse for saving their own skins.

Complete isolation of the higher from the lower organs.

Hysterical appeals for "loyalty," and the branding of the critics of their illegal actions as provocateurs and renegades.

(3) THE INCORRECT POLICY IN REGARD TO THE FRATERNAL ORGANISATIONS

a. The liquidation of the Party by means of the fraternal organisations

Whatever role they are supposed to fulfill in theory, experience in Australia shows that the building of the fraternal organisations (in their present form) checks the growth of the Party, particularly in industry.

They create organisational confusion and bureaucracy; cause the maintenance of social democratic forms of organisation etc.

Only one fraternal organisation, the U.W.M., can be said to have gained real significance or to have been born of struggle. In fact, from the ranks of the U.W.M. have come the majority of the members of the Party, and it has supplied the forces for the building of the other fraternal organisations. With the exception of the P.S.U., which will be dealt with later, all the other fraternal organisations, Workers Defence Corps, Workers International Relief, League against Imperialism etc., have existed as mechanically set up propaganda groups. These organisations have become extended from their centres, which have provided safe havens for opportunists and phony socialists. We find that, with the fraternal organisations in function, their activities overlapped that little independent work that is left for the Party. At a time when the enemy of the Party should have been turned in the direction of establishing itself in the factories and among the working class, it was diverted in the formation of fraternal organisations.

When the fraternal organisations were first set up, they were regarded merely as appendages of the Party, and were mechanically controlled by the Party fraction. Now it is the policy to deny the identity of the Party with the fraternal organisations, without however desisting anyone from making for the building of the fraternal organisations by such appendages.

The very nature of their organisation makes it impossible for the fraternal organisations to be in any way but isolated acts, with no contact with the workers and therefore no connection with the struggle.

The setting up of these organisations is an example of mechanical instructism from the C.I., mechanised by the various Communist fronts. Their centralised form and detachment from the masses that reflect corresponding features, not only in the Communist parties, but in the C.I., which has never taken sufficient account of the mobile character of the movement in each country.

b. Friends of the Soviet Union

This organisation has in Sydney and Melbourne gained a fairly large following. This does not mean that such justification for the need for a separate organisation to appeal "the truth about the Soviet Union." The reason for its rapid development is found in the curiosity of the workers, regarding conditions in the Soviet Union, a curiosity that remained unsatisfied until the formation of the P.S.U., lectures recently returned from Russia were speaking on a popular subject, and so could get a good hearing. The Five-Year Plan was something new, something to be discussed by even the bourgeoisie. Furthermore, the P.S.U. provided an even for these worn out and romantic revolutionaries, whose idea of the class struggle was dwelling in a golden day-dream about the building of Socialism in Russia, ready to applaud the achievements of the Russian workers, but not ready to do anything for Socialism in their own country.

The failure to connect the propaganda of the P.S.U. with local struggles, the lethargy inevitably to the falling away of the popular interest which was at first aroused. The Second Five-Year Plan, despite the claims made for it, in obviously exciting less interest among the working class than the First. This is because it can not be shown that the Russian workers are fighting alongside the rest of the world's workers for a common object. The relationship of the internal and foreign policy of the Soviet Union to the World Revolution has not been demonstrated. We have merely had exposures of the wicked bourgeoisie, who wish to sabotage the Soviet industry and destroy internal peace. Even these exposures have not been put in a form readily understandable by the average worker. The P.S.U. thus appears as a non-revolutionary organisation - a provider of popular lectures - and is such bound to decline still further.
The Minority Movement

The question might be raised as to why the M.W. has stagnated, when, as distinct from other fraternal organizations, it was supposed to be based on the front of the class struggle. It is enough to say that the M.W. has failed to play a decisive part in any struggle, although its line has often been adopted spontaneously by the workers. The M.W. reflects all the deviations of the U.W.M. It has suffered, and still suffers, from excessive centralism, and has been mechanically set up from above. It has been an ineffective substitute for the working of fraternal organizations in the factories (the latter being, as Platinitsky shows, the settled policy of the bolsheviks), and has merely provided Party members with an excuse for evading struggle on the job.

(1) The U.W.M. and the United Front.

If the line laid down by Platinitsky had been followed in the building of the U.W.M., many errors would have been avoided. Platinitsky said that in countries where the Red Trade Unions (and the E.M.) are closely connected with the Party, there the unemployment organizations should be entirely apart and free.

The M.W. in this country, is and always has been identified with the Party. Yet we have the spectacle of the Party openly building the U.W.M. and then proclaiming it for and while a component part of the U.W.M. and thus raising the question of the Party's role in control and changed when the Party thought fit without any consideration for the views of the rank and file of the U.W.M. Was it any wonder that the organization became labelled "communist" and developed sectarianism?

When the sectarianism of the Party had so imprisoned the U.W.M. that most of the socialist democratic members had been driven away in disgust, and the A.D.U. leadership had taken the opportunity of exploiting it as "socialist" organization the organization was abolished, and set about building a new form of organization on the lines of the united front on then promoted by the C.C. The way in which this was carried out is another instance of the sectarianism with which they approach all the problems concerning the rank and file of the fraternal organizations. Despite the fact that the U.W.M. was widely advertised as a "non-party" organization as the United Front of Employed and Unemployed, the decision to abolish it came from above

--FROM THE COMMUNIST PARTY! No attempt was made to call a national conference of the U.W.M. to decide the matter, no attempt was even made to summon a conference of the U.W.M. to decide its fate. Instead, the U.W.M. was immediately liquidated, and the liquidation was a direct result of the United Front of Employed and Unemployed, which is essentially a non-party organization.

The whole significance of the united front tactic was lost to the Party leadership. Instead of following the policy laid down by Platinitsky, the Party leadership liquidated the organization, and as a result the unorganized masses continued to suffer. The organization was dissolved, and the unorganized masses continued to suffer.

In the districts where the Party in the U.W.M. was strong and active, in its application of the united front tactic, Comrade Morcan, a prominent communist candidate at the time, was systematically placed in the leadership. The U.W.M. came out with censure of material about the new organ for the unemployed. Regardless of the fact that the theory of the united front was to be the United Front of Employed and Unemployed, without any specific action being taken among the workers to gain support for the new organ, the consequences were that various councils etc. were set up representing only a small section of the unemployed, and the organization was more sectarian than ever.

Later, it was discovered that the "united front" was a tactic, and the method of applying it was that of radicalizing the organization of the united front from below; but instead of abolishing the so-called State Committee of the U.F. of E. & U., and getting down to the concrete work of forming unemployment councils, etc., (building from below) they once more mechanically changed the name of the organization to the State Unemployed Council, and carried on as before -- building from above.

Through the criminal errors of the Party leadership, the unemployed today are in a state of disorganization more chaotic than ever before. They have gone back to the days prior to the formation of the U.W.M. and the members of the few existing organizations are confused and
confused and bewildered as to what is being done. So thoroughly has the 
unemployed movement been disrupted that it could be said without 
exaggeration, that paid agents of the bourgeoisie could have done no 
better! 
(2) Growth of Bureaucracy. 
The most deplorable indictment that can be levelled at the C.C. is their 
dishonesty of criticism; their adoption of correct resolutions and theses 
yet their refusal to put them into effect, even to the extent of obstructing 
the desire of the rank and file to apply the instructions and directives 
sent out to them. 
A few examples of this dishonest criticism are :-- 
(3) Criticism of right opportunism and bureaucracy.
(4) Talk of factory organisation.
(5) Talk of the need for struggle. 
The machinery of the Party makes it possible for leadership of 
right opportunism and bureaucracy to maintain control under the cloak of "correct" 
resolutions and directives. The Party organisation is not only over 
centralised, but has created such a variety of organisational forms that 
the main activity of the membership has become that of maintaining an 
organisational routine. Mechanical directives from the centre filter 
through finally to the units without having received any concrete 
participation on the way. Until recently, (though an attempt to correct this) there has been a multiplication of departments, which, 
instead of making for a "division of labour", merely make for a lack of 
co-ordination of activities, most of the time of the active Party 
functionaries being spent in attending useless meetings, at which 
precisely the same questions are brought up. 
This over-estimation of the role of the apparatus has resulted in the 
Party machinery becoming an obstacle in the way of further progress, an 
unhealthy growth that, while preventing the independent activity of the 
Party, must eventually react upon itself and destroy the Party. 
The Party organisation continues to think and act, makes 
for hosts of functionaries, stubborn duplication of work, and numerous 
ofices, until, when carried to its logical conclusion we find that the 
whole movement swamps within its own mass of red tape and paper 
amongst the workers. But long before this process is complete, decay 
had already set in and the machine begins to tumble under its own weight. 
Why is it, if it may be asked, that this over-estimation of the role of 
the apparatus has not been overcome by the pressure of the rank and file 
of the Party, when so many become sick of endless meetings and so soon 
realise that something is wrong? The answer lies in the 
undermining of the Party. 
The Party organisation tends to create a special kind of 
bureaucrat who is a product of his environment and training, who cannot 
see any other need than that of attending to the functions of the machine 
that has created him. Therefore, he resists, on the part of those whose 
experience in real work has developed their initiative and understanding 
are easily suppressed, because criticism is only allowed if it will not 
damage the machine; and if it will not menace the power of the 
bureaucrat. The C.C. enforces obedience without discussion. For this reason 
the leading positions in the Districts and Sections must be filled by 
those who are least in touch with the real thing only -- a blind acceptance 
of directives from above! 
Gradually, as the mistakes become evident, those Party members who 
are capable of thinking for themselves, realise that the fault lies with 
the C.C., and so they are slowly eliminated from all positions, or 
expelled from the Party to make way for newer and more subservient 
elements. Thus little by little the leadership becomes 
directly towards preserving a gradually weakening structure, for without 
weakening the structure they must surely be overthrown. 
All this involves the denial of inner Party democracy. Had Party 
democracy been observed, had it been possible for criticism of the 
leadership to be made by lower organs of the Party, if questions were 
allowed to be discussed fully before a decision was made, then we would 
not have had the weakening of the movement through the growth of 
feudalism, and the expulsion of numerous Party members. Instead of a 
violent and long suppressed revolt that split the Party in two, and 
must eventually result in the formation of a new Party, the change 
would have come about more gradually and naturally.
The bureaucracy of the Party reflects the bureaucracy of the C.I., and indeed, was largely by rights at it along with the transition from left-sectarianism to right opportunism, under the influence of the C.I. representative, from the C.I. also, formal instruction are sent out without sufficient understanding of the special problems of each area, and without provision for the development of initiative on the part of the sections, and thus for the concrete carrying out of the instructions. In the C.I., as in the C.P.O.S., no congress is held. Discussion on fundamental issues is not carried through the sections, no local contribution to method or theory are allowed for, and divisions in the organization (especially on the matter of success members) are explained to sound as either undignified or not at all. It is to be emphasized that the behavior of the sections can take place only if there is local initiative, not by the mere laying down of channel lines or directions and forms of organization from above.

(5) Opportunities and the Mechanism for Struggle.

(a) The mass work of the Party is characterized by consistent opportunism, expressed in a dependence upon the spontaneous usurpation of the masses. Instead of giving a clear line for struggle, the Party line is to leave the question for the workers to decide. Notable examples are the Questionnaire struggle and the line of the P.W.I.B. Instead of an intensive campaign against the government's policy of a demand that the paper should not be signed, a picketing of the dumps on the first day and a continuation of the agitation, if the first round failed to rally mass support, instead of this line of organized resistance, the workers were merely asked to burn the forms, and it was pointed out at the same time, that if sufficient could not be organized to do this, nothing would be done; the militants shall not be victimized by the union.

The P.W.I.B., under the leadership of Norman A. B. R. A. S. has twice approached the question of a strike in the pastoral industry (1932-33) by circulating various charts, asking for the opinion of the Provincial Executive the question is, shall we strike? or shall the majority decide that way? What an opportunistic attitude for the work of energetically preparing a campaign under the leadership of the P.W.I.B. with a definite call to action.

Another form of this opportunism is shown by the substitution of deputations to the government for local mass work around immediate demands. Significant examples are the deputation on Feb. 27th, 1933 (I.R.P.D) and the deputation of the W.I.B. on May 17th, 1933. In both cases a list of immediate demands was presented and peacefully received by the government. The organizers admit that nothing can be gained by such a procedure, but they are not likely to be disillusioned when nothing results, nor are they likely to rally to a call for struggle given by those who took confidence in the workers and in their own revolutionary line, as to not only support, but to organize around a line of action that they know to be futile.

On the previous International Unemployed Day (1933), weak tactics were displayed, a thousand responded to the call for a demonstration, and speeches were made to them in the Sydney Domain whilst a deputation waited on the Government. The Govt. refused to see the deputation, and the workers, when this was reported to them, desired to demonstrate before Parliament House. No lead was given them, however, by the leading Party members present, they merely advised the workers to go back to their respective districts and organize. The opportunism is also shown by the adoption of indefinite slogans, the issuing of a refused and contradictory directives. While creating an impression that a lead has been given, these tactics actually sabotage the possibility of struggle. The slogan "AGAINST 48 HOUR STRIKE!" put forward some months ago, was so confusing that the average worker could not understand it. Instead of a positive lead, following the line of the position, and a review of the work already done, the April 1933 issues of the "W.W." came out with a negative slogan: "DON'T WORK 48 HOURS!"
When following a "left" lead, the Globe agitation against the questionnaire developed unexpected mass support, everything that could be done to sabotage the strike was done by the Party leadership. Contrary to plan to sabotage the strike was done by the Party leadership. Contrary to the plan to sabotage the strike was done by the Party leadership. Contrary to the plan to sabotage the strike was done by the Party leadership. Contrary to the plan to sabotage the strike was done by the Party leadership. Contrary to the plan to sabotage the strike was done by the Party leadership. Contrary to the plan to sabotage the strike was done by the Party leadership. Contrary to the plan to sabotage the strike was done by the Party leadership. Contrary to the plan to sabotage the strike was done by the Party leadership. Contrary to the plan to sabotage the strike was done by the Party leadership.
Thirty-three workers offered their services and held their first meeting a few days later. About three Party members were on the committee and put forward an argument that the I.L.P. Nat. Committee be recognised as the controlling body and that all cash collected be forwarded to them. After discussion this was rejected by the mass committee, because, as was pointed out by various members it was the duty of the I.L.P. to work as part of a united front committee, and, by virtue of its superior ability and experience, gain ideological control. It was also pointed out that as the I.L.P. had raised no money support for this cause during the seven months until its disposal, it could hardly expect to mechanically take control of a committee that had been set up without any assistance from the I.L.P. Those who held this committee the sectarian attitude of the Party members became manifest in their refusal to take any further part in the proceedings. Instead of remaining on as a faction and utilising the fact that their line was correct, they acted like pampered and spoilt children.

The following week a slanderous article appeared in the “Red Leader” describing the Rattok Defence Committee as being anti-working-class, and stating that members of it were police agents. This article was based upon a resolution that was carried at a “stacked” meeting of the Central Committee of the I.L.P., whereas previously the I.L.P. Central Committee was not on the agenda. Only a few members, on this occasion no less than 13 Party members were present, presumably for the purpose of ideologically controllling. The two non-party members who were there were instructed from the Party, submitted the Defence Committee’s appeal to the Trades and Labour Council and rejected the allegations of the “Red Leader”. Before the Council, all instructions sent by the committee were confiscated by Party members and the money sent in to the I.L.P. central office. Members of the Gladie and Balmain I.L.P. locals were instructed to withdraw from the Defence Committee, and expelled because they refused to do so. George Shanks, a leading member of the Party, stated at Balmain 24/5/33 that “The reason that the Rattok Defence Committee had been declared anti-working-class, was because there was police agent in its ranks”. Because a member of the committee made an appeal for Ratsko to the platform of Donald Grant in the B.M.P. on Sunday 4/6/33, a vicious attack was launched against the committee from the I.L.P. platform, the defence committee being taunted with speaking from a “social-fascist” platform.

It is very clear from the foregoing that the C.C. has no desire that Ratsko be released. We cannot admit that they are so incogitable, so politically clever as to misunderstand the line of the International Red Aid. There may be other and deeper reasons for their apparent stupidity. It is no more petty spite against individuals that allows them to smash a committee that they failed to control mechanically, rather it is their inherent fear of struggle, based upon opportunism, that forces them to act further and further to the “right” in their frantic attempts to avoid anything in the nature of concrete action.

It is well-known to the I.L.P. that certain expelled members of the Party on the Rattok Defence Committee are better forward in the line of mass struggle, and are actively organizing a mass demonstration on the same day. The C.C. must now abandon its work of sabotage in order to avoid the very signs that might centre around themselves, resulting from this demonstration. However, so futile are their tactics in dealing with the situation, that the only result of this may become the pivot around which the leadership of the Party will whirl to destruction. Day by day, as the positions of the Party become more and more apparent, the hypocrisy of the C.C. becomes clearer to the rank and file of the Party and the militant workers. Harassed on all sides, they are driven to making the most feeble statements in defence of their attitude. Conrad’s statement at Balmain is a fair example. To say that it is necessary to declare a mass committee anti-working-class but that there is a police agent in it, would be humorous if it were not tragic. We will not produce proofs that this man is a police agent. If you will not accept our insinuation without proof then we will declare you anti-working-class. That is the inference that can be taken from these statements. Thirty-three workers are declared anti-working-class because they have not pulled things in the infallibility of the leadership of the Communist Party. And so the Party withdraws its docile members from the mass campaign.

What is this method of avoiding the struggle? ....
Logically, the bourgeoisie have only to place an agent of the police on every committee or fraction set up by the Party, in order to cause the Party members to retire horror-stricken from the scene. While forming the Enlovak Defence Committee with the utmost of speed, the Party has forgotten that they themselves are seeking to form a united front with this same Enlovak and the Party to which he belongs, and their infantile way may be because the Enlovak Defence succeeds where they fail, is unwelcome to say the least of it, among revolutionaries who they are. Above all, their insincerity is shown by the fact that while the Enlovak Defence iserguing around a definite plan of action, they the C.C. are doing nothing but vent their spleen against the only mass committee set up.

The sudden activity of the Party and the I.L.R. in the Enlovak case is an admission of their previous neglect, and is a direct reflection of the activities of the Enlovak Defence Committee. Perhaps the reason for the indifference of the Party leadership in this case may be found in the fact that members of the “left Opposition” to the Enlovak Communist Party are being exiled and galled in the efforts of the Stalinist bureaucracy to establish Socialism in one country, at the expense of the World Revolution.

(d) anti-war Conference April 5th, 1933

This was a good example of a mechanical and a pretended call to the masses, but actually leading them away from the important issues of the struggle. (Rote Marie, C.U.P.

Post-war conferences were held in all centres, representative of only a very small section of the workers, which accomplished nothing save the carrying on of an accurate resolution condemning war.

These conferences of all peace-loving citizens were obviously organized and shaped in the interests of the workers, but merely social democratic in character and had no organizational force. If they were intended to initiate an “all national exposure” (to use Lenin’s phrase), they were doomed to failure, because they were not linked with any demand, except the vague demand for peace. There is a clear connection between this non-revolutionary activity of the R.O.S.U. and the policy of Socialism in one country.

Only the revolutionary strength of the movement on the ships and around the waterfront, in the industries and in the militas, will prevent Australian capitalism from participating in war; but this work has been wilfully neglected for years.

(d) The attitude of the I.L.R. towards the Crimes Act

The I.L.R. has left an impression of the leadership of the Party is expressed very clearly in their conduct before the capitalist courts. A pathetic dependence on bourgeois “Justice” was made evident in the failure to organize mass support around the Devanny trial. Again, in their efforts to ensure mass support, they deliberately made statements against the workers. They were well aware at the time that the only issue was the or otherwise of Devanny, but they attempted to capitalize the Devanny trial, to convince the workers that the C.C. of A. was an immediate menace to Australian capitalism; while at the same time allowing all the agitation around the Bankstown evictions case to lapse, since the Party, in its concern for legality, wished to cover up its subversion in the evictions struggle. The release of Devanny by the capitalist court was a proof that the ruling class of this country realizes the impotence of the C.C. of A. had done nothing to make itself a danger to capitalism in Australia, not only Devanny, but many other members of the Party would have been placed behind the bars, even if it became necessary to manufacture the evidence required for the purpose.

There is again an obvious similarity between the legalistic attitude adopted in this and other cases, and the policy of peace between the Soviet Union and the capitalist world.

6. THE APPEAL TO THE LABOUR PARTY

This appeal (W.L.R. 21/4/33) shows in a striking way the opportunist, liquidationist and bureaucratic nature of the C.C. line. There has been an apparently negligible step in this:

Actually, it is the only logical step to take in view of the collaboration which has already occurred with the Social Democrats under the flag of the united front, and in view of their persistent dragging in the tail of the struggle. But as a tactic, such action could only be correct, when, after a period of independent and fearless
leadership of the workers, the Party had convinced large sections of these workers that unity with the Labour Party was vitally necessary, and when it had itself such a mass following that the rank and file of the Labour Party would also demand co-operation, and would bring pressure to bear on their leaders with that end in view. Then, any refusal by the leaders of the Labour Party would expose them before the masses, and in any case, real mass co-operation would be established.

Can it be said that such a situation exists today? The C.I., largely disinclined to organize the workers, as was H.A.R., instead of flouting to the C.I., radicalised workers who are disgusted with the A.L.P. are forming a new Labour Party. If, as is so often repeated, "the C.I. is the vanguard of the working-class" and the workers had been convinced of this by a concrete application of the statement, would they not have instinctively swung over to the Party that had proved itself a real workers Party? The attempt at formation of a new Party by the radicalised workers (Giles 1920, from A.L.P.) is a definite proof that it is insufficient to merely talk about being the vanguard of the working class.

To procure unity with the Labour Party under these conditions, simply means a further step to the right, and a further sinking of the independent political role of the C.I. It is creating in the minds of the workers the idea that the Labour Party leaders are capable of leading a mass struggle, and to a complete denial of the role of "social Fascism" as previously laid down by the Party.

It is obvious that if the programme of demands as published in the "W.P." of 2/4/30 is accepted by the A.L.P. leaders, the fight must continue until the overthrow of capitalism. To say that we will continue to put up to the dictation of the C.I. as a chequebook Fascism, means a complete renunciation of the political role against the capitalist offensive, the appeal to the workers to continue the revolt and to wage a common stand against Fascism and to be an effective instrument. Just as the catchword "Social Fascism" was not adopted by the Party with any appeal of the working class to be an instrument of Fascism, so the Party is called on to contribute the rank and file masses to the struggle. The C.I. appeal to the Second International, which is printed with the local colour, and has obviously inspired it, is the best possible example of how the local colour itself.

The document illustrates the opportunism of the C.I. of Germany, no consideration of its contents is made for example. The C.I. of Germany was called on to take a common stand against Fascism by the C.I. of Great Britain, and the C.I. of France, and the C.I. of Germany to call on the working class to continue the revolt and to wage a common stand against Fascism, but this call was rejected.

Despite its six million votes at the previous election, it would appear that the C.I. of Great Britain had no power at the moment of crisis. The C.I. has no power to mobilize the working class when it is called on to do so, and the Party is called on to continue the revolt and to wage a common stand against Fascism. The C.I. offers no criticism of the C.I. of Great Britain, no call to action against Fascism, and no call to the C.I. of Germany to continue the revolt and to wage a common stand against Fascism.

The C.I. and its various sections show their opportunism by endeavours to gain support for a united front on the basis of the Fascist attacks on the social democrats, whilst at the same time, denying the C.I. as the vanguard of the revolution. It is obvious that this puerile alliance can offer no advantage to the C.I.istance of the C.I., to the R.S.B., and the rank and file of the C.I. have failed to give a lead, for only a new record of independent leadership can ensure future mass support.

The errors existing in the C.I. are ultimately traceable to the emergence of the policy of building Socialism in the U.S.S.R. from divergence of the Party from the policy of building Socialism in the U.S.S.R.
by the Description of the U.S.S.R. as “The Workers’ Fatherland”, though the workers in the capitalist countries are well aware that they have no control over it, and that it can do them no material benefit to them.

In the C.I., throughout its history, there has been an over-emphasis on Russian problems, in an attempt to apply Russian experience mechanically to other countries. There is no comparison between the pre-revolutionary position of the Bolshevik Party in Russia and the present position of the C.I. in the world, yet an attempt has been made to organise the latter in the same way, and to impose the same discipline. The expectation of an early revolution led to many shortcomings being overlooked in the past, but this, in view of the failure to deal effectively with the Fascist menace, is no longer possible. A stronger basis than ever before must be laid in mass work and the present opportunism and defensiveness, due to reaction from undue optimism, must be corrected on all fronts, by the development of initiative on a basis of continuous struggle.

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THE POSITION OF THE WORKERS’ PARTY

We, the members of the Workers’ Party (left Opposition) believe that:

The past failure to combat right-opportunism in the C.I. of A. is responsible for the fact that when the working class of this country is faced with the introduction of Fascism, and a consequent worsening of conditions, the proletariat finds itself without an experienced revolutionary party capable of leading it in the struggle.

We unreservedly condemn the Executive Committee of the Communist International for failing to insist that its directives on the Bolshevization of the Party are properly carried out; for its support of the present right wing leadership of the C.I. of A. composed mostly of the opportunist tendency headed by the CPC.I. in 1929; and for the non-interventionism that has so stifled the initiative of the Party in this country, and in all sections of the Communist International.

The political basis for this failure can be traced to the contradiction that exists between the foreign policy of the Soviet Union (which dominates the C.I.) and the policy of World Revolution which the Communist International professes to uphold.

We declare that the main task of the Workers’ Party is to fight for the Bolshevization of the revolutionary party in this class and places of work; for the liquidation of the present social-democratic forms of organisation, and for the fearless leadership of the mass struggles of the workers.

We also declare our determination to carry on, before the whole working class, a relentless struggle against all forms of opportunism both within and without the Communist Party.

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